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WHATS GUILT (OR DETERRENCE) GOT TO DO WITH IT?:
THE DEATH PENALTY, RITUAL, AND MIMETIC VIOLENCE
DONALD L. BESCHLE"
INTRODUCTION
For decades, the death penalty has been one of the most pas-
sionately debated topics in American law. Lawyers, social scien-
tists, philosophers, theologians, the mass media, and ordinary
citizens have argued over its wisdom and legitimacy. Remark-
ably, though, when the principal arguments for and against the
death penalty are examined closely, they seem inadequate to the
task of either justifying the death penalty or proving convincing-
ly that it must be abolished.
As a question of constitutional law, the death penalty debate
unsurprisingly has focused on whether executions are "cruel and
unusual" within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.' Beyond
questions of how to give specific content to those general terms,
the government's choice of criminal punishments must meet a
more fundamental requirement. At the very least, due process of
law requires that there be a rational basis for government action
that deprives one of life or liberty.2 Thus, rational argument
must support the choice of punishment. Of course, the choice of
* Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School; B.A. Fordham University;
J.D. New York University School of Law; LL.M. Temple University School of Law.
1. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. Although Justices have disagreed sharply over how stringent the burden is up-
on government to demonstrate that its actions are rational, even the most deferen-
tial would maintain that some minimal rationality must be established. For example,
in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the dissenters did not challenge the
notion that the state of New York must act reasonably in its economic regulation;
rather, they applied a more permissive standard of determining reasonableness. See
id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 66-74 (Harlan, J., with whom White & Day,
JJ., join, dissenting). Professor Cass Sunstein maintains: "Above all, the American
Constitution was designed to create a deliberative democracy ... The minimal con-
dition of deliberative democracy is a requirement of reasons for government action."
CAsS H SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 19-20 (1993).
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punishment never has been subject to strict scrutiny, which
would impose a requirement that the punishment go no further
than necessary to achieve the government's interest.' Still, the
choice by government to impose a severe punishment may not be
arbitrary; rational grounds for the choice are required.
The search for a rational basis for the death penalty has led
to two primary, alternate justifications, both of which abolition-
ists contest.4 The first of these is the consequentialist argument
that imposition of the death penalty furthers clearly defined pur-
poses, usually deterrence, better than do less severe punish-
ments.5 Abolitionists seem most comfortable contesting this line
of argument." Although proponents of the death penalty by no
means concede an inability to demonstrate the validity of their
consequentialist arguments,7 the weight of evidence seems to
refute proponents' claims of deterrence.'
When faced with the weaknesses of deterrence-based
consequentialist arguments, death penalty proponents gravitate
toward arguments based on retributive theory.' According to
this line of thought, desert and individual responsibility justify,
if not demand, the symmetry of capital punishment as a re-
sponse to murder, irrespective of the existence or nonexistence of
any deterrence."0 Though some abolitionists have tried to frame
their case upon retributivist thought, this line of argument is
3. Such a requirement would, more or less, constitutionalize Jeremy Bentham's
classic utilitarian conclusions regarding punishment. Because the end of law "is to
augment. . . happiness" and "punishment... is [an] evil," punishment should not
be imposed in excess of its ability "to exclude some greater evil." JEREMY BENTHAM,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 170 (Wilfiid
Harrison ed., Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd. 1948) (1789).
4. See, e.g., WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT' CRIME AND THE MORAIxTY
OF THE DEATH PENALTY 83-152 (1991); see generally MARVIN HENBERG, RETRIUTION:
EVIL FOR EVIL IN ETHICS, LAW, AND LITERATURE (1990) (exploring retributive
thought).
5. See BERNS, supra note 4.
6. See MARK TUSHNET, THE DEATH PENALTY 5-7 (1994).
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., KILMAN SHIN, DEATH PENALTY AND CRIME 1-71 (1978); FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CON-
TROL 186-90 (1973).
9. See HENBERG, supra note 4.
10. See id. at 221-28.
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used primarily by death penalty advocates."
Recent Supreme Court cases seem to take the position that
the state need not win the consequentialist debate in order to
defend the death penalty. 2 Retribution, it would appear, pro-
vides a sufficient foundation. Analysis of the Court's death pen-
alty jurisprudence, however, shows a surprising lack of sympa-
thy for arguments that seem to go directly to the core concerns
of retributivism, the assessment of personal responsibility, and
even the question of guilt itself." Perhaps these cases indicate
that something else is going on here, something of which the
Justices themselves may be largely unaware, something neither
retributivist nor consequentialist, and perhaps somewhat beyond
the limits of traditional rational argument.
Rend Girard, a theorist whose work attempts to connect liter-
ary criticism, anthropology, and theology, contends that religion,
law, and indeed many of the bonds of civilization and culture,
rely on ritualized violence in order to break and tame the cycle
of imitative, or mimetic, violence that inevitably arises within
society. 4 Girard's theories evoke controversy, but if they are
even partially correct, they may shed a great deal of light on the
role played by the death penalty in American society. They may
explain much that recourse to either consequentialism or
retributivist theory leaves unexplained.
If Girard's theories do help explain the persistence of the
death penalty, they also may require those who debate the issue
to confront new questions. Defenders of the death penalty, on
the one hand, will be hard pressed to establish that, at least as
it is currently administered, it is not weighted down with as-
pects that are not merely inadequate to satisfy a
consequentialist, but perhaps are beyond the scope of what we
can accept as rational, even under retributivist theory. Aboli-
tionists, on the other hand, will be challenged by the apparent
need of society for ritualized community violence. In other
words, is abolition possible without the creation of some alterna-
11. See TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 4-7.
12. See generally id. at 113-17 (discussing recent death penalty decisions by the Court).
13. See id.
14. See REN9 GIRARD, VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED (Patrick Gregory trans., Johns
Hopkins University Press 1977) (1972).
1997]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tives to satisfy a powerful social need, regardless of whether ra-
tional or nonrational foundations form the bases for that need?
Part I of this Article gives a necessarily brief overview of Su-
preme Court death penalty jurisprudence over the last decades,
focusing on the main lines of consequentialist and retributivist
argument put forward by abolitionists and death penalty propo-
nents. Part II explores the ultimate inability of either
consequentialist or retributivist arguments to explain significant
parts of current death penalty jurisprudence satisfactorily. Part
III sketches Girard's theories of mimetic violence and the role of
the scapegoat, and applies these ideas to explain the role of the
death penalty in American society. Finally, Part IV discusses the
implications of accepting an explanatory model based upon
Girard's thought for the future of the death penalty debate.
I. THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE SUPREME COURT:
A BRIEF HISTORY
The Eighth Amendment provides that the federal government
may not impose "cruel and unusual punishments."15 More
broadly, the Fifth Amendment provides that no person may be
"deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law."" The Fourteenth Amendment extends the due process
guarantee to the states, and the Supreme Court has held that
the Eighth Amendment is incorporated in that guarantee, and
thus also binds the states. 7
Before the 1960s, the Supreme Court considered a number of
issues regarding the procedure under which the death penalty
was imposed, but did not seriously entertain the argument that
the penalty was itself unconstitutional."8 In 1889, the Court re-
jected the argument that the new electric chair was a cruel and
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
16. Id. amend. V.
17. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (incorporating the proscription of
cruel and unusual punishment through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
18. See Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (rejecting a due process and
Eighth Amendment challenge to the ability of a state to attempt to execute a pris-
oner after the first attempt had failed); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (reject-
ing a due process challenge).
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unusual means of imposing the death penalty,19 and in a grisly
1947 case, a sharply divided Court held that it was not cruel
and unusual to electrocute a murderer a second time when the
chair malfunctioned and delivered an insufficient shock the first
time."0 In 1931, however, the Court held that a defendant fac-
ing the death penalty was entitled, as other criminal defendants
at the time were not, to appointed counsel.2
In 1963, Justice Arthur Goldberg circulated a memorandum to
his colleagues urging that the Court select several cases for re-
view as vehicles to determine "[w]hether, and under what cir-
cumstance, the imposition of the death penalty is proscribed" by
the Constitution.22 In light of the abolition of the penalty by
most western democracies and declining public support at the
time within the United States, Justice Goldberg contended that
the issue was ripe for consideration.' He also stated that in his
opinion, the death penalty had to be justified as an effective de-
terrent, because vengeance was not "an acceptable goal of
punishment."24 Justice Goldberg's memorandum did not per-
suade the Court to grant review, but it generally is regarded as
the starting point of the contemporary history of the Court's
struggle with this issue.
Between 1963 and 1972, the Supreme Court considered sever-
al death penalty cases, rejecting challenges based both upon the
,absence of clear standards to guide juries in choosing the penal-
ty' and upon the need for bifurcated proceedings to address
19. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.
20. See Francis, 329 U.S. at 463. For a full account of the case, see ARTHUR S.
MILLER & JEFFREY H. BOWfAN, DEATH BY INSTALLMENTS: THE ORDEAL OF WALM
FRANCIS (1988).
21. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). This case was the famous case of the
"Scottsboro Boys," nine young blacks accused of raping two white women. The case
commanded national attention. See generally JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO
(1994) (describing the trial of the "Scottsboro Boys" and the public reaction).
22. Memorandum from Arthur J. Goldberg to the Conference Re: Capital Punish-
ment, October Term, 1963, reprinted in TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 149-62.
23. See TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 155-58.
24. Id. at 159. Justice Goldberg contended that the burden of proving the existence
of a deterrent effect was on the state, and that, at best, the evidence was inconclusive.
See id. at 159-60. The state's burden, therefore, had not been met. See id.
25. See, for example, McC'autha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), which held
that it was not unconstitutional to "commit[ I to the untrammeled discretion of the
491199'7]
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guilt and punishment.26 Several Justices dissented, however,
and, for the first time, significant abolitionist sentiment ap-
peared in the pages of the United States Reports. During this
period, state courts in California"5 and New Jersey' ruled
that the death penalty violated state constitutional provisions.
Finally, in 1972, the Court invalidated the death penalty as
applied under then-existing statutes.30 Furman v. Georgia was
decided not only by the narrowest of margins, but also featured
five separate opinions from the five Justices in the majority.3'
Justices Brennan and Marshall found the death penalty to be
unconstitutional per se;32 Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White
found that its application was arbitrary and discriminatory, but
did not go so far as to state that death penalties could not be
framed in a way that would satisfy constitutional standards."3
The connecting thread running through the five opinions was
the principle that punishment must be rational.' Although
jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases." Id. at 207. In
Witherspoon u. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), however, the Court held that a state
could not enforce a blanket exclusion of jurors with anti-capital punishment senti-
ments from juries in capital cases, but in doing so, recognized and implicitly en-
dorsed the fact that juries might be given wide discretion in imposing the death
penalty. See id. at 518-21.
26. See MeGautha, 402 U.S. at 208-20. The argument in favor of bifurcation is
that a defendant cannot be placed in a position of having to waive his right to be
silent on the issue of his guilt in order to introduce evidence that would serve to
mitigate the severity of his punishment. See id. at 210-11.
27. See id. at 226-312 (Douglas, J., with whom Brennan & Marshall, JJ., join,
dissenting).
28. See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
29. See State v. Funicello, 286 A.2d 55 (N.J. 1972).
30. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
31. See id.
32. "When examined by the principles applicable under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, death stands condemned as fatally offensive to human dignity.
The punishment of death is therefore 'cruel and unusual,' and the States may no
longer inflict it as a punishment for crimes." Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring).
"[Tlhe death penalty is an excessive and unnecessary punishment that violates the
Eighth Amendment." Id. at 358-59 (Marshall, J., concurring).
33. Justice Douglas was concerned with selective application of the death penalty,
particularly its impact on minority defendants. See id. at 249-57 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). Justice Stewart was concerned with the arbitrary way in which the penalty
was imposed, see id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring), as was Justice White, see
id. at 310-14 (White, J., concurring).
34. See id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring);
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death penalty litigation often is thought to revolve around the
Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments also imply this primary requirement of
rationality.35 The basic test of the rationality of a government
act is determining whether it relates to achieving a legitimate
government end.36 Inquiry must begin, then, with an inventory
of the legitimate ends of punishment. The most commonly noted
purposes of punishment are incapacitation,37 deterrence of
others,38 rehabilitation of the offender,39 and retribution-the
most difficult to define clearly.40 Certainly, a punishment that
accomplished none of these goals would be vulnerable to attack
as irrational. Because criminal punishment is an explicit con-
cern of the Eighth Amendment, one would be justified in de-
manding, if not the extremely close fit between means and ends
that strict scrutiny demands, then at least something more than
a minimum suggestion of rationality.41
id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 312-13 (White, J., concurring; id. at 331
(Marshall, J., concurring).
35. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2. Professor Tribe has noted that even in abandon-
ing the strict scrutiny given to means-end relationships during the era of Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), "the Court never wholly abandoned the position that
legislatures ... must always act in furtherance of public goals." LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 582 (2d ed. 1988).
36. See TRIBE, supra note 35, at 582-83.
37. See NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? 34-41 (1991). Incapacitation, that is, render-
ing the individual offender unable to repeat his crime, is usually a temporary mat-
ter, running the length of the offender's prison term. See id. at 34. Thus, "most sen-
tences merely postpone opportunities for reoffending." Id. Of course, the longer a
prison term, the closer a sentence gets to substantially, if not entirely, incapacitating
a prisoner.
38. See generally ZIMERING & HAWKINS, supra note 8. Deterrence usually is dis-
cussed in terms of its effect on others, rather than on the offender, although the
offender also may be deterred in the future. See id. at 18-33.
39. See PHILIP BEAN, PUNISHiMENT 53-65 (1981). Although rehabilitation generally
is seen as the most modem theory of punishment, it can trace its philosophical roots
to Plato and St. Thomas Aquinas, among others, who saw "[w]ickedness [as] a men-
tal disease," and "punishment ... as a moral medicine." Id. at 54.
40. See the excerpts from Kant, Hegel, and others collected in PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 102-35 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1977) [hereinafter
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES]; see also the extensive treatment of the subject in
HENBERG, supra note 4.
41. The requisite closeness of the fit between legislative means and ends is one of
the most pervasive issues in constitutional law. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2; TRIBE,
supra note 35.
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To Justice Brennan, punishment became arbitrary, and thus
unconstitutional, when it exceeded the severity necessary to
achieve any of the accepted goals of punishment.42 The death
penalty obviously does not seek to rehabilitate. Justice Brennan
stated that life imprisonment could achieve incapacitation, and
that the "remote and improbable" risk of death was unlikely to
have a significant deterrent effect.43 As for retribution, which
Justice Brennan described as "[tihe asserted public belief that
murderers... deserve to die,"" the fact that the overwhelming
majority of murderers were not punished by death led him to
the conclusion that "the execution of a random few" did not fur-
ther the retribution goal significantly.
45
Justice Marshall's opinion is probably best known for its rejec-
tion of the notion that uninformed public opinion could suffice to
establish the constitutional acceptability of the death penalty.
46
For the purposes of this Article, however, it is more significant
that Justice Marshall alone among the Justices explicitly reject-
ed retribution's legitimacy as a goal of punishment."' Overstat-
ing the empirical case, he maintained that "no one has ever seri-
ously advanced retribution as a legitimate goal" in contemporary
America, but that the debate concerning capital punishment was
"always mounted on deterrent" arguments. 48 Perhaps more in-
42.
A punishment is excessive . . . if it is unnecessary: The infliction of a
severe punishment by the State cannot comport with human dignity
when it is nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffering. If there
is a significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purpos-
es for which the punishment is inflicted . . . the punishment inflicted is
unnecessary and therefore excessive.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). Here, Justice
Brennan essentially puts forward the position of Jeremy Bentham: Because "all pun-
ishment in itself is evil . . . it ought only to be admitted -in as far as it promises to
exclude some greater evil," and "[it] ought not to be inflicted .... where the mis-
chief may be prevented ...without it: that is, at a cheaper rate." BENTHAM, supra
note 3, at 158-62.
43. Furman, 408 U.S. at 302 (Brennan, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 304 (Brennan, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 304-05 (Brennan, J., concurring).
46. See id. at 329-33 (Marshall, J., concurring).
47. See id. at 342-45 (Marshall, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 363 (Marshall, J., concurring). Although consequentialist arguments were
more prominent in the years preceding Furman, retribution was not entirely without
[Vol. 38:487494
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teresting was his assertion that to accept retribution as a legiti-
mate goal would render the Eighth Amendment essentially un-
enforceable: "all penalties selected by the legislature would by
definition be acceptable means for designating society's moral
approbation of a particular act."49
Justices Douglas, White, and Stewart did not reject the notion
that the death penalty might be defended on rational grounds,
but they found fatal flaws in the then-current practice. The se-
lective imposition of death, and the likelihood of its application
in unacceptable discriminatory ways troubled Justice Douglas.0
Justices White and Stewart each accepted the legitimacy of ret-
ribution, but found that imposition of capital punishment on a
"capriciously selected random handful"5' of offenders could not
meaningfully satisfy what Justice Powell termed humankind's
"retributive instincts."52
Although the four dissenters obviously found capital punish-
ment to be rational and constitutionally justifiable, their opin-
ions primarily sounded a theme of judicial deference to legisla-
tures rather than mounting a direct defense of the death penal-
ty." In fact, several Justices felt compelled to disparage the
its defenders. See, e.g., H.J. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, 8
INQUIRY 239 (1965), reprinted in PHILOSOPHIcAL PERSPECTiVES, supra note 40, at
119-34.
49. Furman, 408 U.S. at 344 (Marshall, J., concurring).
50. See id. at 250-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). "[Wihen imposition of the penalty
reaches a certain degree of infrequency, it would be very doubtful that any existing
general need for retribution would be measurably satisfied." Id. at 311 (White, J.,
concurring).
52. Id. at 454 (Powell, J., dissenting).
53. "If today's opinions demonstrate nothing else, they starkly show that this is
an area where legislatures can act far more effectively than courts." Id. at 403 (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting). "[The abolitionist argument] makes sense only in a legislative
and executive way and not as a judicial expedient." Id. at 410 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). "The sobering disadvantage of constitutional adjudication of this magnitude
is the universality and permanence of the judgment. The enduring merit of legisla-
tive action is its responsiveness to the democratic process, and to revision and
change ... ." Id. at 462 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The most expansive reading of the leading constitutional cases does not
remotely suggest that this Court has been granted a roving commission,
either by the Founding Fathers or by the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to strike down laws that are based upon notions of policy or
morality suddenly found unacceptable by a majority of this Court.
1997] 495
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practice: Justice Blackmun stated that as a legislator, he would
vote against the death penalty; 4 Chief Justice Burger stated
that he might vote similarly under the same circumstances;'
and Justice Powell, in the course of analyzing the goals of pun-
ishment, stated that retribution was a permissible, although
perhaps "unworthy" rationale.56
Although the abolitionist community widely regarded Furman
as the final victory, 7 the case contained the seeds of its own
demise; one that would come swiftly. Because at least two Jus-
tices in the Furman majority believed that the death penalty
could be made rational, and therefore constitutionally accept-
able, by being made more determinate, legislators explored ways
of doing just that. The most determinate option, of course, was a
mandatory death penalty, but, in 1976, the Court found such
statutes unconstitutional, at least as applied to broad categories
of murder.58 A constitutionally acceptable death penalty, it was
held, must permit "particularized consideration" of the crime
and the defendant.59 In Gregg v. Georgia,'o however, the Court
approved a statute that gave "guidance" and "direction" to a jury
in deciding which defendants should be sentenced to death.6
Once again, most Justices either expressly or implicitly endorsed
both deterrence and retribution as legitimate goals of punish-
ment,62 but now it was held essential to consider the particular
blameworthiness of the defendant.'
Thus, the Court has taken the position that a rational system
Id. at 467 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 453 (Powell, J., dissenting).
57. "With Furman, the . . . campaign against the death penalty appeared to have
reached a successful . . . conclusion . . . . The Court, it might have seemed, had
abolished the death penalty." TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 54. "To many observers,
Furman had, for all practical purposes, ended the practice of executions in America."
FRANKiN E. ZMING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERCAN
AGENDA 64 (1986).
58. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
59. Id. at 303.
60. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
61. Id. at 192-98.
62. See id. at 183-87; i& at 207-26 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
63. See id. at 183-87.
496 [Vol. 38:487
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of retribution (and apparently also of deterrence) may not insist
that the punishment automatically mirror the criminal's act.
Retribution must indicate society's response not merely to the
consequences of the act, but also to the extent to which the actor
was unusually dangerous or blameworthy. Three Justices reject-
ed this view, and voted to uphold mandatory death sentences;"
Justices Brennan and Marshall continued to insist that all death
penalties were unconstitutional;' and Justice Marshall re-
newed his argument that retribution was not a legitimate basis
for punishment.6
Although most of the Justices rejected the contention that ret-
ribution was an illegitimate purpose of punishment, case law ex-
isted to support the contention that retribution alone might be
suspect.67 Deterrence appeared to be the more secure justifica-
tion. Post-Gregg developments, however, suggest a distinct re-
versal of that position. In 1977, the Court held that the death
penalty as punishment for rape was unconstitutionally exces-
sive.' The Court also held that the death penalty could be used
only in cases of intentional murder; it was impermissible if ap-
plied to a defendant who neither killed nor demonstrated any
intent that anyone be killed. 9 Most commentators interpret
these cases to indicate that death constitutionally may be im-
posed only for murder.
64. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 306-07 (White, J., with whom Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J.,
join, dissenting).
65. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 227-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231-41 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 23941 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. "In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at par-
ticularly offensive conduct .... 'Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of
the criminal law,' but neither is it a forbidden objective .... " Id. at 183 (citing
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949)).
68. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 597-98 (1977) (stating that although
"[s]hort of homicide, [rape] is the 'ultimate violation of self", the death penalty was
"an excessive penalty for the rapist who ... does not take human life").
69. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982). Nevertheless, the Court has sub-
sequently held that a participant in a felony who did not himself kill another might
receive the death penalty under felony murder principles if he was a "major" partici-
pant and displayed "reckless indifference to human life." Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 158 (1987).
70. This seems to be the clear implication from Coker. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 597-
98 (noting that "life ... is not over" for the rape victim). As Professor Mark
1997] 497
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In terms of pure deterrence, of course, the conclusion that the
death penalty can only apply in murder cases could not be sus-
tained. Although the efficacy of using the death penalty to deter
murder may be questioned,7 no reason exists to believe that it
would deter other crimes any less. The conclusion that rape and
other felonies may not be punished by death seems to indicate
clearly that, perhaps surprisingly, deterrence may not be the
sole rationale behind the imposition of severe punishment. Far
from being an illegitimate justification, retribution seems to be
an essential element of the modern justification of the death
penalty.
Since 1977, the basic principles established in Gregg and the
cases immediately following it have been maintained. The argu-
ments that have broken out generally have accepted their basic
paradigms. The death penalty itself is now impervious to consti-
tutional challenge; Justices Marshall and Brennan, the consis-
tent dissenters on that point,72 no longer sit on the Court.
Death still requires justification as being rational, however, and
when an individual case or a general practice suggests that
capital punishment might be arbitrary, the Court at least has
taken challenges seriously, more so than any fundamental at-
tack on the per se use of the death penalty.7"
These challenges, though not entirely ignorant of matters of
deterrence, 4 focus primarily on the extent of the defendant's
Tushnet wrote: "Since 1977, it has been generally accepted that capital punishment
is reserved for people who commit murder; if death is an excessive punishment for
rape, it appears hard to come up with a crime other than murder for which it
would not be excessive." TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 74.
71. See generally ZIvMRNG & HAWKINS, supra note 57, at 167-86 (stating that the
deterrent effect is nil or very small in relation to total homicide volume).
72. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. See, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50 (1984) (determining that a California
statutory scheme was not "arbitrary" for failing to require proportionality review).
74. In Coker, the Court struck down the death penalty for rape "even though it
may measurably serve the legitimate ends of punishment." Coker, 433 U.S. at 593
n.4. Presumably, deterrence is at least one of those ends. In Enmund, while focusing
on individual culpability, the Court also noted: "We are quite unconvinced, however,
that the threat that the death penalty will be imposed for murder will measurably
deter one who does not kill and has no intention or purpose that life will be taken."
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798-99 (1982).
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blameworthiness, highlighting the centrality of the retributive
justification for the death penalty. Thus, at some point the
offender's age will make death unconstitutional. The Court has
noted that "such a young person is not capable of acting with the
degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate penalty."75
Although a mentally retarded person may be executed,7" an in-
sane person may not be.7 Given the distinctions that the Court
has made, these decisions must relate more to retribution and
blameworthiness than to deterrence. Unsuccessful challenges
have been framed in terms of retribution, as well. The argument
that the death penalty is subject to racial bias7' assumes that if
capital punishment is to exist, it should be reserved for those
most blameworthy, untainted by extraneous factors.79
In recent years, the futility of direct attacks on the constitu-
tionality of capital punishment has led to a series of procedural
disputes focusing on the availability of habeas corpus review of
state proceedings.'o In general, the Court has displayed grow-
75. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988). The Court held that a de-
fendant who was 15 years old at the time of the crime could not be executed. See
id. Even the dissenters, although unwilling to set the age at 16, agreed that "at
some age a line does exist ... below which a juvenile can never be considered fully
responsible for murder." Id. at 872 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 338-39 (1989) ("In light of the diverse
capacities and life experiences of mentally retarded persons, it cannot be said on the
record before us today that all mentally retarded people, by definition, can never act
with the level of culpability associated with the death penalty.").
77. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
78. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting a statistically
based argument that Georgia's death penalty was administered in a racially discrim-
inatory way).
79. McCleskey argued, for example, not only that black defendants were more
likely than white defendants to be sentenced to death, but also that the race of the
victim was highly significant. See id. at 321 ("[Clases involving black defendants and
white victims are more likely to result in a death sentence than cases featuring any
other racial combination of defendant and victim .... ") (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. See J. Thomas Sullivan, 'Reforming" Federal Habeas Corpus: The Cost to Fed-
eralism; The Burden for Defense Counsel; and the Loss of Innocence, 61 UMKC L.
REV. 291 (1992) (discussing the Court's movement toward a more restrictive view of
the writ of habeas corpus); see also Joseph L. Hoffman, Is Innocence Sufficient? An
Essay on the U.S. Supreme Court's Continuing Problems with Federal Habeas Corpus
and the Death Penalty, 68 IND. L.J. 817, 818 (1993) (noting that recent. Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence has taken a "process oriented" approach focusing on death
penalty procedures, rather than a "substantive" approach focusing on the extent to
which particular death sentences are deserved).
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ing impatience with the length of postconviction proceedings,
and has acted to expedite the actual imposition of the penalty."'
Many of the particulars of these disputes are unnecessary for
this Article's purposes, but, as will be discussed below, the gen-
eral tone of impatience has led to at least a few decisions that
should trouble those who are committed to defending capital
punishment based on retributive theory. At this point, it will be
useful to step back from the specific decisions of the Supreme
Court and discuss more broadly the rationales that have been
used to justify or attack capital punishment over the years.
II. RATIONALIZING PUNISHMENT
Evidence of the existence of a sense that some limits must be
placed on the range and severity of punishment imposed upon
criminals preceded the drafting of the Eighth Amendment. 2
Enlightenment reformers debated the question of punishment,
and insisted that it must be justified as producing some recog-
nizable benefit." They viewed the imposition of suffering as
bad, and therefore not a legitimate end in itself." Although
reformers acknowledged the fact that the act of imposing pun-
ishment might itself produce pleasure, that sort of "benefit" was
unworthy of rational human beings.' Under this view, to pun-
81. Professor Sullivan has noted that lt]he political and judicial outcry for 'reform'
of federal habeas corpus practice has been mirrored in a series of recent Supreme
Court decisions effectively streamlining the process for seeking federal relief from
state court convictions." Sullivan, supra note 80, at 291 (citing Delo v. Stokes, 495
U.S. 320 (1990); Woodard v. Hutching, 464 U.S. 377 (1984)).
82. - As early as 1809, a volume of the views of various prominent thinkers on the
question of capital punishment could be compiled, including, among others, Beccaria,
Montesquieu, Thomas More, Erasmus, Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Johnson, and
Jeremy Bentham. See generally BASIL MONTAGU, THE OPINIONS OF DIFFERENT AU-
THORS UPON THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH (reprint, William S. Hein & Co. 1984) (1809).
83. See id.
84. See BENTHAM, supra, note 3, at 29 (outlining his formulation of the principle).
85. Benjamin Franklin, arguing against the common 18th century practice of exe-
cuting thieves, analogized excessive punishment to crime itself. "To put a man to
death for a crime which does not deserve death, is it not murder?" Letter from Dr.
Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin Vaughn, Esq. On the Criminal Laws, and the Prac-
tice of Privateering (Mar. 14, 1785), in 1 MONTAGU, supra note 82, at 161. He went
on to describe an execution for minor theft as "barbarous . . . bloody-minded, and
revengeful." Id. at 164.
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ish for no other reason than to enjoy the imposition of pain was
bestial.86 The punisher, under those circumstances, became no
better than the criminal. 7
By no means were the reformers without opposition. Some
commentators defended unbridled vengeance as necessary to
address some fundamental human instinct.'m The nineteenth
century, however, saw the fundamental victory of the position
that the imposition of punishment, and its degree, had to be jus-
tified. Physical punishments and banishment largely gave way
to prison sentences. 9 Special treatment for juveniles and the
insane began to take root as well." To a large extent, this post-
Enlightenment trend was committed to rehabilitation as its pri-
mary rationale; thus the particular characteristics of the individ-
ual convict were of central importance."
Perhaps out of frustration at its limited success, rehabilitation
largely has faded from popular discussion of rationales for pun-
ishment, with the possible exception of cases involving juve-
niles. 2 Of course, the death penalty does not, and never has,
found its justification in rehabilitation. Rehabilitation has been
relevant to the death penalty debate only insofar as abolitionists
have argued that the obvious irrelevance of the penalty to reha-
bilitative ends calls for its rejection. 3 Thus, for purposes of this
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. For a discussion of the pervasiveness of retributive thought, see HENBERG, su-
pra note 4, at 21-42. Henberg discusses some of the extremes to which the urge to
retribution can lead, such as the historic practice of trying and executing animals for
the damage they caused, as well as the possibility that there may be a genetic basis
for the urge to retaliate. See id.
89. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
74-82 (1993).
90. See id. at 163-66 (discussing the development of separate juvenile justice sys-
tems); id, at 140-48 (discussing the insanity defense and related issues).
91. For discussion of the development of prisons in the late-18th and early-19th
centuries, and the rise and fall of the rehabilitative ideal, see Randall McGowan,
The Well-Ordered Prison: England, 1780-1865, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRIS-
ON 79-109 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995); and David J. Rothman,
Perfecting the Prison: United States 1789-1865, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE
PRISON, supra, at 111-29. For a discussion of the rehabilitative ideal of the "reform
school" for juvenile corrections, see Steven Schlossman, Delinquent Children: The
Juvenile Reform School, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra, at 363-89.
92. See BEAN, supra note 39, at 169.
93. One might argue that execution "rehabilitates" the offender in that, by paying
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Article, rehabilitation as a legitimate goal can be put aside.
A second rational goal of punishment is incapacitation of the
defendant, that is, assuring that he is unable to repeat his
crime. Surely, the death penalty incapacitates, but this justifica-
tion of capital punishment does not seem prominently advanced
in either scholarly or popular debate. Life imprisonment effec-
tively achieves incapacitation nearly as well as does death. 4
The rare instance of a murder in prison committed by a convict
already serving a life sentence does not seem to generate great
public concern and a death penalty limited to this small number
of cases will not satisfy death penalty proponents. Most current
debate over capital punishment therefore turns on two broad
justifications: deterrence of others and retribution.
The argument connected most obviously to rational thought,
with its insistence upon a demonstration of the connection be-
tween means and ends, is the argument based upon deterrence.
The contention that the threat of execution will cause at least
some killers to abandon their plans is intuitively appealing, and
continues to draw wide support.95
the ultimate price, he purges his guilt and is reconciled to God. Apparently, the
Mormon doctrine of "blood atonement", which maintains that a murderer who has
spilled another's blood must not only die, but actually have his own blood spilled, in
order to expiate his guilt in the eyes of God was instrumental in leading the Utah
legislature to establish and maintain the firing squad as a mode of execution. See
Martin R. Gardner, Illicit Legislative Motivation As a Sufficient Condition for Uncon-
stitutionality Under the Establishment Clause-A Case for Consideration: The Utah
Firing Squad, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 435, 440-49. This type of "rehabilitation," howev-
er, is hardly what the term signifies in common usage; this type of "rehabilitation"
actually seems more properly to be a form of retribution.
94. The public understandably is concerned with the possibility of a convicted
murderer being released and killing again, but the rate of recidivism among released
murderers is extremely low. See Hugo Adam Bedau, Recidivism, Parole and Deter-
rence, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 173, 175-80 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d
ed. 1982). This, of course, may be due to the fact that the least pernicious killers
are the most likely to be paroled. Even this concern is mooted in large part by im-
posing a sentence of life without parole.
95. The most prominent academic proponent of the existence of a deterrent effect
has been Isaac Ehrlich. See Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punish-
ment: A Question of Life and Death, AM. ECON. REv., June 1975, at 397; Isaac
Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and Inference, 85 YALE L.J. 209 (1975). But see
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 57, at 174-79 (attacking Ehrlich's views and meth-
odology). The empirical evidence, however, probably is less important in the debate
than the strong intuitive feeling that somehow, capital punishment must deter. Er-
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The notion that deterrence stands as a sufficient justification
for the death penalty is subject to two strong lines of attack.
First, empirical support for the existence of a deterrent effect is,
at best, sparse. No correlation exists between the presence or
frequency of the death penalty and the murder rate in various
states." Within particular states, the murder rate does not
seem to respond to changes in the imposition of death.97 Al-
though the findings are not quite unanimous, 98 and cannot be
definite because clinical precision cannot be obtained in the ab-
sence of knowing the unknowable fact of how many murders
would have been committed at a particular time in a particular
state were the law different, the general consensus among social
scientists is that the deterrent effect of the death penalty is
unproven.'
One response to this situation might be to argue that the bur-
den is not on the defenders of a historically common punishment
to prove its efficacy, but rather upon its opponents to prove the
opposite."® Because that probably cannot be done, given the
inability to set up a valid controlled experiment, history and
intuition should prevail. This proposition, however, does not
answer the second argument against the use of deterrence to
justify the death penalty. If deterrence alone could justify the
death penalty, then there would be no reason to limit its use to
crimes involving the taking of life. Indeed, there would be no
nest van den Haag wrote: "Even though statistical demonstrations are not conclu-
sive... I believe that capital punishment is likely to deter more than other pun-
ishments because people fear death more than anything else.... Whatever people
fear most is likely to deter most." Ernest van den Haag, The Death Penalty Once
More, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 965-66 (1985).
96. See Thorsten Sellin, Homicide in Retentionist and Abolitionist States, in CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT 135 (Thorsten Sellin ed., 1967).
97. See SHIN, supra note 8, at 25-36.
98. See Ehrlich's two articles, supra note 95.
99. See ZIMEING & HAWKINS, supra note 57, at 167-86.
100. This appears to be the position taken by the Supreme Court:
Considerations of federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a legis-
lature to evaluate, in terms of its particular State, the moral consensus
concerning the death penalty and its social utility as a sanction, require
us to conclude, in the absence of more convincing evidence, that the in-
fliction of death as a punishment for murder is not without justification.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186-87 (1976).
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reason to limit its use to any category of the most serious
crimes. Surely the risk of death might deter burglars, embez-
zlers, those who operate illegal gambling operations, and a host
of others. Indeed, because many of these lesser crimes more
commonly are the products of calculated decisions to break the
law than is homicide, which often is the product of an eruption
of passion, the use of the death penalty might be more of a de-
terrent for these lesser crimes.'0 ' History validates this posi-
tion; prior to the nineteenth century, executions for crimes that
neither took nor endangered life were common.'
Over the last two hundred years, governments clearly have
rejected that conclusion, first, by legislatures drastically limiting
the list of capital crimes, and finally, by the Supreme Court rul-
ing that the constitution demands some proportionality between
crime and punishment and that therefore death may serve to
punish only those who take, or at least threaten, life. 103 It is
apparent, then, that deterrence alone, even if well established,
cannot serve to fully justify the death penalty.
Perhaps because of this realization, but more likely because of
the inability to demonstrate actual deterrent effects of capital
punishment, proponents largely have shifted ground.", If not
actually conceding deterrence's failure to justify capital punish-
ment, academic proponents have come to rely more on retribu-
tion to justify the death penalty.0 5 Commentators have at-
tempted to demonstrate that retribution, properly understood, is
101. Thus, in Coker, the dissenters pointed out that the death penalty might well
deter rapists at least as effectively as it deters murderers. See Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 617 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The majority countered this view by
stating that a penalty may not be disproportionate 'even though it may measurably
serve the legitimate ends of punishment." Id. at 593 n.4.
102. The earliest Anglo-American abolitionist arguments were directed largely
against the broad range of capital offenses. For a list of dozens of capital crimes
other than murder, see the excerpt from P. Colquhoun (1800), reprinted in 1
MONTAGU, supra note 82, at 80-83.
103. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
104. See van den Haag, supra note 95, at 965.
105. Thus, Ernest van den Haag, after pointing out that most abolitionists he has
discussed the question with would still abolish the death penalty even if its deter-
rent effect could be proven, states: "[Deterrence] is not necessary for me either, since
I would be for capital punishment on grounds of justice alone." Id. at 965.
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a more sophisticated concept than mere revenge.' Unlike de-
terrence, retribution depends heavily upon concepts of propor-
tionality, and upon the idea that to call upon the criminal to
experience approximately the same fate as his victim is almost
self-evidently just."'7 By committing the crime, the criminal
has, in effect, indicated that he believes that such an act is per-
missible. When society inflicts the same fate upon the criminal,
it then does so, in a sense, at the criminal's own invitation.'
In a more metaphysical way, the retributive act restores some
sort of balance that existed prior to the commission of the
crime.
0 9
Like deterrence, retribution cannot fully supply the underly-
ing rationale for severe punishment. Most strikingly, the princi-
ple that punishment literally should recapitulate the crime,
which is at the heart of the retributivist case for capital
punishment,"0 clearly would be rejected in a wide range of
other contexts. A person who is guilty of assault is not physically
assaulted and a rapist is not raped. Little doubt exists that were
a state to either assault the assaulter or rape the rapist, such
punishment would be found unconstitutional."' The response
106. See, e.g., HENBERG, supra note 4, at 17-29.
107. See id& at 59-76.
108. This notion is associated most closely with Immanuel Kant.
The undeserved evil which any one commits on another, is to be regard-
ed as perpetrated on himself. Hence it may be said: "If you slander an-
other, you slander yourself; if you steal from another, you steal from
yourself; if you strike another, you strike yourself; if you kill another,
you kill yourself."
ItMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 196 (photo. reprint, Augustus M. Kelley
Publishers 1974) (W. Hastie trans., 1887).
109. Marvin Henberg has written about this "hydraulic" or "homeostatic" meta-
physical view, where God or nature demands "an equal and opposite reaction to
each crime or sin" in order to place the world back in balance. See HENBERG, supra
note 4, at 81-83.
110. See id. at 165.
111. Even the dissenters in Furman could state: "Neither the Congress nor any
state legislature would today tolerate pillorying, branding, or cropping or nailing of
the ears-punishments that were in existence during our colonial era. Should, how-
ever, any such punishment be prescribed, the courts would certainly enjoin its execu-
tion." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 430 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). See also
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968), where the court, in an opinion
written by Judge, later Justice, Harry Blackmun, found Arkansas's use of the strap
to discipjine prisoners to be unconstitutional. Id. at 579.
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to this argument might be that only in the case of homicide is
literal retribution necessary; in other cases, a rough equivalence
of pain can be struck through some combination of prison, mone-
tary penalties, and shame to equal the harm caused."' Only
death, however, equals death.' The loss of all freedom, assets,
and honor is inadequate.1
4
This view is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it
proves too much. If homicide uniquely justifies capital punish-
ment, then what of the long history .of use of the penalty for
lesser crimes? Death was chosen as a punishment centuries be-
fore it could be justified as a mirror image of the crime in-
volved.'15 The justification of retribution seems to be a post hoc
rationalization, rather than the original foundation, of the death
penalty. Second, along the same lines, if the punishment must
mirror the crime, should all willful homicides mandate the death
penalty? Such a regime has been found unconstitutional,"6 and
it almost certainly would meet with public disapproval. The exis-
tence of the death penalty as a likely or certain punishment has,
in the past, led juries to acquit even in the face of strong evi-
dence of guilt."7 Popular opinion does not support the notion
112. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 205-12 (2d ed. 1986) (stat-
ing that the legal system generally acts in a way that indicates that the harm done
by crimes can be translated into a common currency, either of money itself or jail
time, sufficient to deter and to redress whatever harm was done).
113.
[W]hoever has committed murder, must die. There is, in this case, no
juridicial substitute or surrogate, that can be given or taken for the sat-
isfaction of Justice. There is no Likeness or proportion between Life,
however painful, and Death; and therefore there is no Equality between
the crime of Murder and the retaliation of it but what is judicially ac-
complished by the execution of the Criminal.
KANT, supra note 108, at 198.
114. See id.
115. See DAVID D. COOPER, THE LESSON OF THE SCAFFOLD (1974) (indicating that
the death penalty was widely used in the 1700s).
116. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
117. Judge Robert Sullivan, in examining the history of the trial of Lizzie Borden,
concluded that the fact that a conviction would have led to the death penalty was a
significant factor in leading to an acquittal despite copious evidence of guilt. See
ROBERT SULLIVAN, GOODBYE LIZZIE BORDEN 191-94 (1974). Sullivan went on to won-
der "how many persons have escaped punishment for murder solely because the
death penalty was the jury's only alternative to acquittal." Id. at 194.
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that all murderers should die. Executing some murderers be-
lieved to be particularly blameworthy should satisfy the retribu-
tive urge.
Third, apart from the death penalty, retribution does not seem
to be the primary goal of punishment, even if one accepts the
notion that the harm inflicted by the criminal can be translated
into a roughly equivalent amount of loss of liberty. If retribution
motivated the punishment of all crimes, the public would not
demand increased prison terms for a wide range of crimes.
When the public calls for more severe punishment for thieves or
burglars or vandals, the nature of the crimes has not changed.
What has changed is society's assessment of the efficacy of the
present punishment as deterrence. A consistent retributive re-
gime would serve to limit increases, as well as reductions, in
punishment.
Perhaps the practice rather than the theoretical underpin-
nings of the death penalty present the most profound problem
with employing retribution as a justification. Retribution is, of
course, absolutely dependent upon the guilt of the criminal."'
One powerful argument for retribution as a better theory than
deterrence is that deterrence might be achieved by the execution
or other punishment of the innocent, as long as the general pop-
ulation believed that they were guilty.' To the retributivist,
however, inflicting a penalty, especially the death penalty, upon
an innocent person would be inexcusable.
Among the general public, perhaps the most common citation
in support of retribution is the Old Testament edict demanding
118. See BEAN, supra note 39, at 13 (discussing the essential connection between
punishment and guilt).
119. Perhaps the easiest criticism of pure reliance on utilitarian theory to justify
punishment is that "it would be possible to manufacture evidence against an inno-
cent man to set an example to others.... Alternatively. . . . if the advantage of
deterrence could be achieved by seeming to punish the criminal it would then be
possible to pretend to punish him." Id. at 34. No one would defend intentional exe-
cution of the innocent merely for deterrence, but some are untroubled by the execu-
tion of the innocent by mistake, concluding that the social benefits of the death pen-
alty outweigh "the loss of innocent lives through miscarriages." van den Haag, supra
note 95, at 967.
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an eye for an eye. 2 ' This, like all retributionist theories, is a
double-edged command. It not only warns against inadequate
punishment, but also against excessive punishment. 2' Fur-
ther, it warns even more strongly against punishment of the
innocent."= It is instructive to see how ancient Israel itself put
the demand into practice, especially with respect to the death
penalty. The procedural demands necessary to sustain a capital
sentence were increased to a level that would put the Warren
Court to shame." The Sanhedrin, the judicial body having fi-
nal authority over death sentences, it is said, would be regarded
as "bloody" or excessively prone to sustain death sentences if
executions exceeded one every seven years."
Observers have noted that this same phenomenon has become
manifest in contemporary Israel. Not only is the death penalty
reserved for those implicated in genocide against the Jewish
people," but the recent remarkable restraint of Israeli appel-
late courts in freeing John Demjanjuk, accused of atrocities dur-
120.
The first and, in most parts, oldest version of the lex talionis is Exod.
21.22-25: "When men strive together, and hurt a woman with child, so
that there is a miscarriage, and yet no harm follows, the one who hurt
her shall be fined, according as the woman's husband shall lay upon him;
and he shall pay as the judges determine. If any harm follows, then you
shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for
foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe."
HENBERG, supra note 4, at 69 (quoting 21 Exodus 22:25).
121.
Critics of retributive thought often argue that retribution is indistinguish-
able from revenge, but it is exactly the search for limitation that sepa-
rates the two. Retribution is a measured return of evil according to some
notion of what an agent (or group) is perceived to deserve. Revenge, on
the other hand, is an unmeasured return of evil that may or may not
connect to desert.
Id. at 18.
122. See Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Guilt: Henry Friendly Meets the
MaHaRal of Prague, 90 MICH. L. REv. 604, 618 (1991) (noting that Jewish law developed
"rules ... so strict that they assureld] conviction of only the factually guilty").
123. See id. at 616-25. The authors noted that, compared to Jewish law relating to
criminal procedure, "the restrictions embodied in the Bill of Rights [are] rather tep-
id." Id. at 618.
124. Or perhaps one every 70 years. See id. at 618 n.83.
125. See TOM TEICHOLZ, THE TRIAL OF IVAN THE TERRIBLE: STATE OF ISRAEL V.
JOHN DEMJANJUK 96 (1990).
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ing World War II, demonstrates the demands placed on one who
would seek retribution of the most drastic and final kind to take
similarly extreme measures to assure that unjust executions do
not occur."'
This same impulse can be seen in decades of American law.
The unique nature of the death penalty has led the Supreme
Court to demand what some have called "super due process," a
web of procedural protections beyond those usually afforded to
criminal defendants.127 In recent years, however the notion
that capital cases require extraordinary procedures has lost
much steam." Rather than seeing long delays and the infre-
quent use of the death penalty as reaffirmation of the demands
of certainty associated with retributive theory, some see such de-
lays as illegitimate.129
Perhaps most striking has been the Court's discussion of the
question of actual innocence. To delay an execution because of
constitutional violations collateral to guilt may well interfere
with retribution; to delay an execution because of lingering
doubt as to guilt is quite different. Yet the Court, although not
without hesitation and dissent, has set formidable procedural
hurdles to those who claim new evidence of innocence.' The
Court has refused to hold explicitly that the execution of a de-
fendant in the face of significant evidence of innocence would be
unconstitutional.'' If delay on collateral questions places retri-
126. See Iva L. Shafiroff, A Nazi Saved by Jews: Israeli Court Was Very Generous
to Demjanjuk, LA DAILY J., Sept. 24, 1993, at 6. Demjanjuk's appeal was "one of
the longest appeals in Israel's history." TEICHOLZ, supra note 125, at 302.
127. See William S. Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Re-
cent Retreat from Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 737, 738 (1985).
128. See id. passim; Yale L. Rosenberg, Kaddish for Federal Habeas Corpus, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 362 (1991).
129.
A pattern seems to be developing in capital cases of multiple review in
which claims that could have been presented years ago are brought for-
ward-often in a piecemeal fashion-only after the execution date is set or
becomes imminent. Federal courts should not continue to tolerate-even in
capital cases-this type of abuse of the writ of habeas corpus.
Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 380 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring).
130. See generally Joseph L. Hoffman & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution,
1993 SUP. CT. REV. 65 (arguing that the Court in recent years has restricted the use of
habeas because it does not think of habeas as part of the criminal justice system).
131. In Herrera v. Collins, 560 U.S. 390 (1993), the Court rejected a second habeas
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bution beyond utilitarian concerns in a hierarchy of values, de-
lay in the interest of resolving claims of innocence surely does
the opposite."3 2
A strong adherent of deterrence theory would not find this
troubling; the existence of executions of the innocent is the price
paid for the social benefit of deterrence.' Few deterrence pro-
ponents, however, seem willing to go that far, at least explicit-
ly."M When considering an individual case, surely deterrence
alone may not justify the death penalty. Yet, when the analysis
shifts to the system as a whole, deterrence is invoked more
prominently.'35 The effect of accepting deterrence as sole justi-
corpus petition by a death row inmate that was based on evidence of actual inno-
cence, rather than on any alleged violation of procedural rights. See id. at 393, 418-
19. Although three dissenters would hold that a defendant who could show "that he
is probably innocent" is entitled to habeas corpus relief, id. at 442 (Blackmun, J.,
with whom Stevens & Souter, JJ., join, dissenting), the majority disagreed. See id.
at 402-03. Justices Scalia and Thomas simply would hold that there is no constitu-
tional right to judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence. See id. at 427-29
(Scalia, J., with whom Thomas, J., joins, concurring). The other Justices assumed,
"for the sake of argument," that a "truly persuasive demonstration" of innocence,
meeting an "extraordinarily high" standard of proof, might require federal interven-
tion "if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim." Id. at 417. Be-
cause the Court suggests that the existence of the governor's pardon power is an
acceptable alternative "state avenue," see id. at 411-17, the suggestion seems to be
that the actual innocence argument is open only when a governor denies clemency
in the face of indisputable proof of innocence. In other words, it is unlikely ever to
be available in practice.
132. "[B]ecause of the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual inno-
cence would have on the need for finality in capital cases, and the enormous burden
that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on the States,"
the Court has rejected the notion that actual innocence claims should be routinely
heard. Id. at 417.
133. See, e.g., van den Haag, supra note 95, at 967 (rejecting the notion that mis-
carriages of justice support abolishing the death penalty). In contrast, Margaret Jane
Radin has written:
A pure utilitarian would argue that we should execute whomever, and
however many, we need to in order to deter the "right" amount ....
Whether someone is guilty of a crime or deserves to die for it is not of
concern to the pure utilitarian. But no one in her right mind is a pure
utilitarian.
Margaret Jane Radin, Proportionality, Subjectivity and Tragedy, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1165, 1170 (1985).
134. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 133, at 1170.
135. See Mary Ellen Gale, Retribution, Punishment, and Death, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 973, 1019 (1985).
510
DEATH PENALTY AND MIMETIC VIOLENCE
fication for systemic imperfections is, of course, to accept, per-
haps unconsciously, that guilt is not essential.'36 Such a con-
clusion undermines any sophisticated retributive justification for
punishment.
Thus, neither of the commonly invoked rationales succeeds in
explaining the acceptability of the current system of capital pun-
ishment. Deterrence clearly fails, whether examined with an eye
toward the empirical question of whether it is effective, or the
theoretical question of whether, if effective, it alone can justify
capital punishment. Retribution can serve as a rationale for cap-
ital punishment, but it cannot explain the willingness of a sys-
tem of capital punishment to accept any noticeable likelihood of
the execution of the innocent. Likewise, it is hard to see how re-
tributive theory supports a system in which only a tiny subset of
killers is put to death, and those who are, are not necessarily
the most culpable." 7
One is left, then, with two alternatives. The first alternative is
that the death penalty successfully is defended by the deft use of
both deterrence and retribution in tandem. Thus, retribution
would justify most executions and those that cannot be so justi-
fied would instead be justified by deterrence. One or the other
theory would succeed in explaining each aspect of contemporary
American capital punishment. Indeed, this often seems to be the
way in which the death penalty actually is defended, whether
consciously or not. 3 This explanation is unsatisfying. It seems
136. Cf van den Haag, supra note 95, at 967 (explaining that imperfections are
inherent in any government-operated system and that innocents are killed accidental-
ly by routine government functions).
137. A sophisticated retributive theory does not focus merely on the act; it also
focuses on "the subjective culpability of the offender committing it." Gale, supra note
135, at 1012. Clearly, the Supreme Court's post-Gregg insistence on some consider-
ation of the particular circumstances of the murder recognizes this principle. See
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-87 (1976) (requiring that the blameworthiness of
the defendant be considered). Reaction to the imperfection of "proportionality review"
procedures varies. Compare F. Patrick Hubbard, 'Reasonable Levels of Arbitrariness"
in Death Sentencing Patterns: A Tragic Perspective on Capital Punishment, 18 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1113 (1985) (arguing that no system can be perfect and that we must
accept a level of "reasonable arbitrariness"); with Radin, supra note 133, at 1172
(concluding that "no one can deserve to die when the issue of whether anyone can
(ideally) deserve to die is morally uncertain and when in any event it is certain that
we cannot select out all and only those who deserve to die").
138. Cf Hardy Jones & Nelson Potter, Deterrence, Retribution, Denunciation and
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too cobbled together, too obviously an after-the-fact attempt to
defend an a priori position.
The second alternative is that neither of the rationalist expla-
nations is really at the core of society's acceptance, perhaps
need,'39 for capital punishment. At least occasionally, observers
note the symbolic uses of capital punishment. " ° Often, this is
done in a way that emphasizes the entertainment value of an
execution; however, this may also be subsumed in deterrence
theory, because the symbolism of the execution is seen as a
warning to others, or in retributive theory, because that symbol-
ism is meant to express the community's outrage.'4 Inevitably,
then, discussions of symbolism collapse back into discussions of
one of the major rationalist justifications, or they simply assume
that the symbolism of the act, once removed from rational expla-
nations, self-evidently cannot support the death penalty.
Perhaps, however, this argument dismisses too easily the non-
rational, not merely as an explanation of what goes on, but more
importantly, as something that has such strength that it must
be dealt with in a more respectful way rather than simply being
dismissed as unworthy. A possible place to start such an effort
to understand and to react to the power of the death penalty can
be found in the work of the anthropologist and social and liter-
ary critic Ren6 Girard.
Death Penalty, 49 UMKC L. REV. 158, 169 (1981) (arguing that even if capital punishment
could be based on a deterrence theory, the justification would have to be supported by
retributive consideration).
139. Cf HENBERG, supra note 4, at 32-42 (theorizing that humans have biologically
and culturally evolved to desire retribution for past wrongs).
140. See, e.g., Gale, supra note 135, at 996-99; Jones & Potter, supra note 138, at
167-69 (arguing that the death penalty is expressive, but in the opposite way than
its defenders believe); see also, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 96-105
(1970) (discussing the expressive function of punishment generally); Elizabeth D.
Purdum & J. Anthony Paredes, Rituals of Death: Capital Punishment and Human
Sacrifice, in FACING THE DEATH PENALTY: ESSAYS ON A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUN-
ISHMENT 139-55 (Michael L. Radelet ed., 1989) (exploring the "socio-religious" aspects
of executions by comparing modem executions in Florida with human sacrifices of
the Aztecs).
141. Thus, Professor Gale has classified denunciation as one of the utilitarian as-
pects of capital punishment. Gale, supra note 135, at 996-99. Purdum and Paredes
view some explanations of the capital punishment ritual as being "unabashedly reli-
gious." Purdum & Parades, supra note 140, at 151.
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III. MIMESIS AND THE SCAPEGOAT:
THE THEORIES OF RENl GIRARD
Ren6 Girard, Professor of French Literature, Language, and
Civilization at Stanford University, has developed a sweeping
and controversial theory of culture."' Beginning with insights
drawn from his original academic base in literary criticism, his
theory has grown to include work in anthropology, religion, psy-
chology, and other social sciences. As might be expected, the
wide scope of his work invites criticism from specialists; the at-
tempt to forge a simple unifying theory to explain human cul-
ture will almost invariably claim too much. Yet one need not
accept the full measure of his thought to be impressed by the
power of his insights and their ability to illuminate at least sig-
nificant parts of culture.
Beginning with his work as a literary critic, Girard explored
classic portrayals of human action and, more significantly, the
motivations and decisions behind them. Repeatedly, he
found that great works of literature demonstrate that the source
of human desire is neither some characteristic of the person who
desires nor the object that is desired.'" Rather, desire is rooted
in mimesis, the need to imitate others.'45 People want an ob-
ject, a way of life, or the love of another person primarily be-
cause someone else does as well. 45 This desire is the source of
envy and recurring conflict. On occasion, as in Cervantes's Don
Quixote, this compulsion to imitate can be comic. 47 Perhaps
more often, however, it leads to rivalry and possible tragedy.148
142. The most thorough presentations of Girard's ideas can be found in GIRARD, su-
pra note 14, and REN9 GIRARD, THINGS HIDDEN SINCE THE FOUNDATION OF THE
WORLD (Stephen Bann & Michael Metteer trans., 1987) [hereinafter THINGS HIDDEN].
Probably the best single volume explaining and developing Girard's thought, particu-
larly its implications for contemporary religion, is GIL BAILIE, VIOLENCE UNVEILED:
HUMAN=TY AT THE CROSSROADS (1995).
143. See Paul Dumouchel, Introduction, in VIOLENCE AND TRUTH: ON THE WORK OF
REN9 GIRARD 1-21 (Paul Dumouchel ed., 1988).
144. See GIRARD, supra note 14, at 145.
145. See iad at 143-68; THINGS HIDDEN, supra note 142, at 283-98; see also BAILIE,
supra note 142, at 111-20.
146. See GIRARD, supra note 14, at 145.
147. See THINGS HIDDEN, supra note 142, at 15-16; Dumouchel, supra note 144, at 3-6.
148. This pattern of mimesis leading to rivalry and tragedy is a recurring literary
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Girard did not stop at the insight that mimesis is often at the
center of fiction, however. Examining material from the social
sciences, particularly anthropology, he concluded that humans
have a universal tendency toward mimesis. 49 At some level,
this seems empirically irrefutable; the socialization of the child,
of course depends on it. 5' Girard maintains that the imitative
impulse continues throughout life, and unlike the situation in-
volving the small child, often is hidden and unrecognized. 5' To
a certain extent, imitation is a positive occurrence, as one seeks
to model oneself after others in ways that may be benign and
even beneficial. At some point, however, imitation becomes rival-
ry and rivalry becomes hostile.'52 The desire to be like another
person, and to desire what the other person desires, leads to
conflict, which itself leads to a redoubling of the effort to imi-
tate, supplant, and become the rival.' Inevitably, this cycle
must lead to violence; the goal of cultural institutions is to inter-
vene to stop it. 54
theme beginning with Greek tragedy, see GIRARD, supra note 14, at 46-48, and the
earliest Bible stories, see BAILIE, supra note 142, at 137-40, and continuing through
the works of Shakespeare, see THINGS HIDDEN, supra note 142, at 36, Dostoevsky,
see id. at 338-47, and George Eliot, see Dumouchel, supra note 143, at 6-8.
149. See THINGS HIDDEN, supra note 142, at 3-138.
150.
[T]here is nothing, or next to nothing, in human behavior that is not
learned, and all learning is based on imitation. If human beings suddenly
ceased imitating, all forms of culture would vanish. Neurologists remind
us frequently that the human brain is an enormous imitating ma-
chine....
... [I]n children-as in animals-the existence of acquisitive imitation
has been recognized by researchers....
An equivalent situation rarely occurs among adults. That does not
mean that mimetic rivalry no longer exists among them ... but
adults . . . have learned to fear and repress rivalry.
Id. at 7, 9.
151. See id. at 7-19.
152. See id.
153. Thus, the function of the law, and other cultural institutions, is to prohibit
imitation, at least that sort of imitation that spirals out of control and becomes de-
structive. See id. at 10-19. This function is inherently very tricky. Much imitation
gives rise to cohesion, and, of course, to cultural transmission. See id. To this extent,
mimesis is necessary. At some point, however, it becomes destructive. See i& Law
and other cultural institutions attempt to stop it at or prior to that point. See id.
154. See id.
514
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Normal cultural institutions, however, may inadequately re-
strain this escalating violence because mimesis ensures that
each violent act attracts its own imitators, and each mimetic
desire converges so that more and more individuals see them-
selves as rivals for the same objects."s At some point, the need
to stop the cycle of rivalry requires that a dramatic step be tak-
en to reunite the community. Because violence must return vio-
lence, this step itself must be violent.'56 A common enemy
must be identified, and the community must come to believe
that this enemy is the source of all discord in the communi-
ty.'57 The enemy then can be dispatched and this act of vio-
lence will not lead to a response, because the victim will have no
supporters in the community. At least until the cycle repeats it-
self, society averts the crisis caused by mimetic violence.'
A huge paradox then arises. The victim who was targeted as
the source of all evil now has become the source of the
community's peace and order."9 The victim in some way now
becomes sacred, the bestower of good and evil. 60 Perhaps the
155. See GTRARD, supra note 14, at 18-27.
156. "Only violence can put an end to violence, and that is why violence is self-
propagating. Everyone wants to strike the last blow, and reprisal can thus follow
reprisal without any true conclusion ever being reached." Id. at 26.
157.
[A]ny community that has fallen prey to violence or has been stricken by
some overwhelming" catastrophe hurls itself blindly into the search for a
scapegoat. Its members instinctively seek an immediate and violent cure
for the onslaught of unbearable violence and strive desperately to con-
vince themselves that all their ills are the fault of a lone individual who
can be easily disposed of.
Id. at 79-80.
158.
Where only shortly before a thousand individual conflicts had raged un-
checked between a thousand enemy brothers, there now reappears a true
community, united in its hatred for one alone of its number. All the
rancors scattered at random among the divergent individuals, all the dif-
fering antagonisms, now converge on an isolated and unique figure, the
surrogate victim.
Id. at 79.
159. "[Tlhe surrogate victim-or, more simply, the final victim-inevitably appears
as a being who submits to violence without provoking a reprisal; a supernatural be-
ing who sows violence to reap peace; a mysterious savior who visits affliction on
mankind in order subsequently to restore it to good health." Id. at 86.
160. See id.
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community now will see the victim as having controlled the
entire process, rather than having been its passive object.16' In
this process, Girard saw the origin of religion.
According to Girard, religion attempts to recreate and main-
tain the sense of the community's unity through controlled reen-
actment of the murder of the victim.'62 Perhaps through a
highly ritualized actual killing, perhaps through some symbol-
ism or reenactment of gestures short of the killing itself, com-
munity leaders will repeat this founding murder." At the
same time, however, the reenactment will be strictly limited. It
will be performed only when, by whom, and in the way so pre-
scribed by the community. To engage in the same act outside of
the sanctioned parameters will be prohibited, will be, in effect,
sacrilege.'6
The victim, of" course, need not actually be guilty of anything
in order for the process to be effective. In fact, the victim most
assuredly is not guilty of all that the community believes him to
be guilty of-that is, instigating all of the community's discord.
To bolster his argument, Girard relied on the practice of primi-
tive societies lacking an accepted and powerful central governing
system.'65 When a murder threatens the stability of the com-
munity, the community's leaders will find a victim to sacrifice,
but quite consciously will avoid selecting the person who actual-
ly is guilty of the act that threatens the community.'66 Al-
though this approach appears to be bizarre, it is quite logical
when one recalls that the fundamental purpose of the sacrifice is
to bring peace to the community.6 7
The true killer likely is a full member of the community, one
with relatives and friends. If he is killed, it will set off another
round of retaliation from those who will take his side. Instead,
161. See id. at 94-99.
162. See id. at 99.
163. Thus, the function of ritual is to require imitation of unifying violence, but
under strict control. See THINGS HIDDEN, supra note 142, at 19-23.
164. In addition to the required reenactments of religious ritual, the primary func-
tion of law and other cultural institutions is to restrain mimesis. See id. at 10-19.
165. See GIRARD, supra note 14, at 22.
166. See id. at 21-22.
167. See id.
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the community leaders will select one who can deflect the cycle
of violence by assuming the role of the enemy of the entire com-
munity, including the guilty party's clan.1" Although the vic-
tim has been chosen arbitrarily, the community will actually be-
lieve that he is responsible for the community's discord.'69 To
destroy this belief exposes the killing of the victim as merely
another step in the cycle of violence that would itself require
counterviolence.
Girard has noted that the sacrificial victim is seen as both a
part of, and outside, the community. 7  He is part of the com-
munity in that his death will bring peace, and he will, therefore,
be seen as intending benefit to the community.' 7' The sacrifice
comes about by directing the entire community against the vic-
tim; labeling him as distinctly "sacrificable."172 Examples of
this behavior in primitive tribes are not hard to find. Often the
sacrificial victim is a stranger or outsider, but not until the
community somehow virtually enfolds him.73 When animal
sacrifice replaces human sacrifice, it is likely to be the sacrifice
of a domestic animal, that is, one who lives within the human
community.
174
Although the victim may have been chosen arbitrarily, the
168. In a modem culture, the way to gain unanimity is for the system to "reorga-
nize itself around the accused and the concept of guilt.... Instead of following the
example of religion and attempting to forestall acts of revenge ... or to redirect
them to secondary objects, our judicial system rationalizes revenge . . . ." Id. at 21-
22. The purpose, however, remains the same, to unite all in the community and to
end the cycle of violence. See id.
169. See id.
170. '[AilI victims, even the animal ones, bear a certain resemblance to the object
they replace; otherwise the violent impulse would remain unsatisfied. But this re-
semblance must not be carried to the extreme of complete assimilation, or it would
lead to disastrous confusion." Id. at 11.
171. See id. at 270-71.
172. Id. at 270-72 (The victim becomes a "monster.. . no longer regarded in the
same way as the other members of the community").
173. Thus, prisoners of war and slaves commonly were chosen as sacrificial victims,
as were children. See id. at 271. In all those cases, the victim is not fully part of
the community, but is nevertheless within it. See id. In a more advanced society,
judicial condemnation will serve to brand one as being beyond the moral community,
while still living within it.
174. See id. at 272-73.
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community still must believe in his guilt.'75 Primitive societies
have developed rituals in which the sacrificial victim is encour-
aged, or even required, to violate social taboos, and to claim
great privileges prior to the time of the sacrifice.76 Thus, the
community sees the sacrifice as avenging these acts, and reaf-
firms its adherence to the taboos that serve to restrain the ac-
quisitive rivalry that exists in community life.'77
The need to re-create, at least symbolically, the "founding
murder" may be seen in a number of institutions. Girard saw
this as the basis of all religions.' The pattern may be seen
elsewhere, however, especially in a time in which traditional
religion receives less community respect. The pattern by which,
for example, entertainers or politicians are singled out as spe-
cial, showered with privileges and praise, and then attacked by
the same people who lionized them, symbolically, if not literally,
"killing" them by destroying their career or reputation, seems
consistent with the victimage process. The contemporary appli-
cation of the death penalty is also consistent with this process.
To hypothesize that the primary reason behind the death pen-
alty is its function as a symbolic sacrifice, meant to bring about
peace by uniting the community, permits one to explain a num-
ber of features of the contemporary death penalty that simply
are not consistent with the rationalist theories that either deter-
rence or retribution serve as its basis. Some of these features
are peripheral, for example, the tradition of the last meal. This
tradition is akin to the traditions in primitive cultures, whereby
the sacrificial victim is permitted, if not required, to exercise
privileged behavior prior to the sacrifice.'79 The ritualized priv-
ilege gives the community a reason to-kill because the victim
has claimed a privilege that he does not deserve, but also marks
175. See id. at 271-72.
176. See id. at 104-07.
177. In some tribes a prisoner chosen to be killed would first be "encouraged to
violate the laws," permitted to steal, or subjected to a ritualistic attempt to escape.
See id. at 274-75. Societies might choose to execute their kings, and require that the
king ritually engage in forbidden acts, including acts of violence or incest, either
actually or symbolically. See id at 104-10.
178. See THINGS HIDDEN, supra note 142, at 30-47.
179. See GMARD, supra note 14, at 275.
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the victim as, paradoxically, someone special and worthy of
special treatment.'80 Thus, the condemned prisoner may have
anything he wants as a last meal; once again privilege precedes
execution.
More importantly, Girard's theories explain more salient fea-
tures of the death penalty. For example, if retribution or deter-
rence were truly the foundation of the contemporary death pen-
alty, one would expect that it would be imposed on the most cal-
culating, evil killers. Yet one sees that, instead, it is often im-
posed on those who, like the sacrificial victim, are like typical
members of the community, but at the same time are significant-
ly different. Executing the young,'' the mentally retarded,8 '
or members of a minority group'" will not serve deterrence and
in many cases will not serve retribution, as well as would execut-
ing those who more closely resemble the majority of the commu-
nity. As we have seen, the choice of a victim who is in some sig-
nificant way not like everyone else actually furthers the efficacy
of the sacrificial victim by making it easier for most, or all, of the
community to avoid empathy or identification with him.'"
The community's fascination with at least some of those exe-
cuted individuals also comports with Girard's theories. Why does
a Gary Gilmore or a Ted Bundy continue to be the subject of
biography and even fiction years after he is dead? One might say
that it is a function of society's "fascination with evil," but that
phrase merely restates, rather than explains, the phenomenon.
Could this be a reflection of the phenomenon of elevating the
sacrificial victim to the status of a god?'"
If the function of the sacrifice is to unify a fragmented com-
munity, and if ritual killing rather than actual killing can per-
form that function, one would expect actual killing to be in de-
mand most where ritual is least effective. Thus, where religion
180. See id.
181. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. But see infra text accompanying
notes 206-08 (discussing the impact of the belief that the death penalty is
disproportionately applied to minority groups).
184. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
185. See GIRARD, supra note 14, at 275.
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is more privatized, and where religious and other social diversity
exists, the legal system and its rituals may need to assume this
religious function. One would predict, then, that the death pen-
alty most likely would be used in a more culturally diverse soci-
ety. This is consistent with the often-noted fact that the cultur-
ally and religiously diverse United States is unique among west-
ern democracies in its use of the death penalty." Nations that
have renounced the death penalty generally are more homoge-
nous; such homogeneity provides alternative channels for ex-
pressing community unity.'87
Most significantly, the theory accounts for the recent tendency
of courts to place less emphasis on complete certainty of guilt
and more emphasis on expediting the execution process." As
this Article has shown, the efficacy of the sacrifice depends not
upon the actual guilt of the sacrificial victim,'89 but upon the
community's willingness to believe in that guilt. At some point,
however, too cavalier an attitude toward guilt or innocence
would destroy the execution's unifying power; the execution
would merely become another act of unjust violence, calling for
its own retribution, or as Girard would see it, imitation."9
Girard saw an evolution in the ways that society "avoid[s] be-
ing caught up in an interminable round of revenge."' The
highest level of human development is the creation of an effec-
tive modern judicial system.92 Such a system constrains social
violence by appealing to principles of justice, and identifying the
community's enemies by a convincing demonstration of guilt.
93
This emphasis on a reliable finding of guilt will, to many, sharp-
ly distinguish modern legal systems from primitive societies that
186. See ZRMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 57, at 3-25.
187. Of course, not all ways of celebrating cultural unity and homogeneity are posi-
tive. Solidarity within the group can be the cause, or the effect, of xenophobia or
war. See BAILIE, supra note 142, at 60-64, 157-63.
188. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
190. The judicial system can use its own violence to cure the violence of the crimi-
nal "without fear of contagion" only to the extent that it can rationalize revenge as
being directed only at the guilty. GIRARD, supra note 14, at 21-23.
191. Id. at 20.
192. See id. at 20-21.
193. See id. at 22.
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relied on ritual sacrifice or such methods as trial-by-combat. To
Girard, these differences only mask the extent to which each
system serves the same goal.1" Like more primitive systems,
modern legal systems seek to break the cycle of imitative vio-
lence by directing the punitive urge of all members of society
toward a common enemy.
If the primary function of the death penalty is to provide a
ritual by which to unite the community in common opposition to
a particular individual, allowing it to break the escalating cycle
of intracommunity violence, what does that mean for the debate
over the legitimacy of the death penalty? Are abolitionists ask-
ing the right questions? Is effective argument even possible un-
der these circumstances? How does a legal system based upon
rational argument deal with a matter so weighted down with
hidden, seemingly nonrational considerations?
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF GIRARD'S THEORIES TO THE DEATH
PENALTY DEBATE
As an overarching explanation of all cultural institutions,
Girard's theories of mimesis and sacred violence surely may be
subject to criticism. Can all desire essentially be mimetic? At
some basic level, the desirability of an object such as food is gen-
erated by the self (without it, one dies) and by the nature of the
object (when one is hungry, the relative value of bread and card-
board is surely not a function of the fact that someone else
chooses bread). Further, all modeling does not lead to escalating
rivalry. Some degree of imitation is absolutely essential to pre-
serve the species; the young must model themselves in ways
that allow them to grow and thrive.
It is just as difficult, however, to deny that Girard has identi-
fied phenomena that are of great significance and that explain
much of human violence and the attempts, themselves violent,
made to contain it. Specifically, Girard's theories have remark-
able explanatory power when applied to the imposition of the
death penalty. Much of what surrounds the death penalty and
seems puzzling in light of rational analysis is utterly logical
194. See id. at 23.
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when executions are seen as sacred mimetic violence.
A. How Well Does the Theory Explain the Use of Capital
Punishment in Contemporary America?
First, this Article addresses some peripheral matters. The tra-
dition of the sumptuous last meal offered to the condemned pris-
oner remains a subject of peculiar fascination for the media and
the public.'95 The ritualistic sacrifice performed by a number of
societies required that they grant some privileged status to the
victim prior to his execution.9 ' Thus, the victim might be in-
vested with the trappings of royalty ceremoniously, and actually
allowed to enjoy unusual benefits prior to the sacrifice. The "last
meal" would seem to be a vestige of this type of ritualistic grant
of privilege to one who will then be executed for the effrontery of
enjoying unusual privilege.
A truly bizarre, if uncommon, twist on capital punishment is
provided by instances in which a death row prisoner, perhaps on
the very brink of execution, falls ill or attempts suicide.'97 At
this point, the state frantically works to restore the prisoner's
health, so that he might then be executed.9 8 If the purpose of
195. Media descriptions of last meals are legion. See, e.g., Rhonda Cook, Execution
Is Still on Schedule for Killer of Students in 1981, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 2,
1996, at C3, available in 1996 WL 8206111 ("fried bass, cole slaw, hushpuppies,
french fries with ketchup, tartar sauce and hot sauce [and] either sweetened iced tea
or a Coke"); Richard C. Paddock, Triple Killer Prepares to Die As Appeal Rejected,
L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at Al ("fried pork chops, baked potato, asparagus, salad
with bleu cheese dressing, French bread with butter, apple pie with ice cream and a
glass of whole milk"); James Varney, Time Runs Out for Killer; Antonio James Is
Put to Death, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar. 1, 1996, at Al, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Notpic File ("fried oysters, fried shrimp, fried catfish, crawfish
etouffee, seafood gumbo, hush puppies, French fries, pecan pie and Coca-Cola"). In
fact, this phenomenon is not limited to the United States. See, e.g., Tan Ooi Boon,
Martin Hanged, Leaving Behind Mystery Over Another "Victim", STRAITS TIMES (Sin-
gapore), Apr. 20, 1996, at Home 25, available in LEXIS, News Library, Strait File
("pizza and a cup of hot chocolate").
196. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
197. Perhaps the most famous instance of this phenomenon involved Nazi leader
Hermann Goering. See JOSEPH E. PERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL 421-25,
445-47 (1994). In some jurisdictions, more death row inmates die of suicide than are
executed. See Michelle Locke, Suicide, Natural Causes: How Most Inmates Die on
Death Rows, CI. TRiM., Mar. 6, 1996, at 2, available in 1996 WL 2650108.
198. Indeed, failure to do so might well violate the prisoner's right to medical
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capital punishment is simply to achieve the rational benefits
presumed to flow from the prisoner's death, this sequence of
events is absurd. If one examines ritual sacrifice, one sees that
societies place overwhelming importance on precise adherence to
the ritual; if each step is not followed exactly, it will not be seen
as effective in re-creating the unifying primal sacrifice. 9 ' The
prisoner who commits suicide spoils the ritual. If the execution
is seen as symbolic, it becomes clear why merely seeing to it
that the condemned prisoner is dead will not do.
More important is the explanatory power of Girard's theories
with respect to more fundamental matters. If, on the one hand,
the purpose of the death penalty is deterrence or retribution, one
would expect it to be seen as clearly inappropriate when some-
one whom the community could not see as being fully volitional
or fully like others were involved. If, on the other hand, the pur-
pose of the death penalty is to unite the community in a ritual
expression of violence against someone seen as an outsider, then
a fully volitional requirement is inapposite; it actually furthers
the goal of community catharsis to execute someone who is no-
ticeably unlike everyone else. The latter conclusion seems closer
to describing the contemporary American death penalty. Youth
and mental retardation, except when they become extreme, do
not bar execution."'0 The media dwells consistently on the bru-
tal, "animal-like" behavior of the condemned which led to his
sentence.2"' Most commentators agree that Susan Smith was
spared the death penalty by the successful efforts of her lawyers
to "humanize" her, by showing the jury that she was, ultimately,
a person not that different from themselves, rather than some
Medea-like, °20 alien, creature.0 '
treatment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In general, prison authorities
have a duty to avoid "deliberate indifference" to prison suicides. See Tittle v. Jeffer-
son County Comm'n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539 (11th Cir. 1994).
199. For a comparison of ritual in Aztec human sacrifice and the contemporary
American death penalty, see Purdum & Paredes, supra note 140, at 140-53.
200. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Joseph J. Gilbert, Strange Justice in Maryland, WASH. POST, Oct. 2,
1996, at A17 (noting, in an opinion piece, the brutal nature of a crime); William
Miller, Pirtle's Execution Upheld, Court Affirms Death Penalty for Brutal Spokane
Murders, SPOKESIAN REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Oct. 13, 1995, at B1, available in 1995
WL 8790446.
202. See generally, EURIPIDES, MEDEA, in 1 PLAYS OF EURIPIDES (Edward P.
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The theory would seem to explain much of the media coverage
of executions and those executed. Organized demonstrations out-
side prison walls to celebrate the execution, and the media's cov-
erage of these events, can be seen as attempts to formally pro-
claim the community's newfound unity in its hatred of the crimi-
nal.2" The continued fascination with the criminal, whether
Gary Gilmore, John Wayne Gacy, or Ted Bundy, betrays some-
thing more; the community makes the condemned man a celebri-
ty, someone special, someone who has played an active role in
uniting the community, albeit against himself.
Perhaps most significantly, Girard's theories help to explain
why most of the capital punishment debate has been so fruitless.
An argument based upon deterrence is beside the point if what
supports the impulse behind executions is far removed from the
rational calculus of cost and benefit that the deterrence debate
assumes as its foundation. An argument based upon retribution
and desert likewise will miss the central point of the ritual that
surrounds the death penalty. Additionally, the theory can ex-
plain why the reinstatement of the death penalty has not ended
demands for its expansion and for other increases in the level of
punishment of criminals.
Girard has stressed that the efficacy of the ritual killing of the
common enemy is only effective if it actually does lead to sub-
stantial unanimity among the rest of the community. °5 If a
substantial part of the community sees a killing as being unjust,
it becomes just one more step in the mimetic escalation of vio-
lence, one that itself calls for a violent response, which will in
Coleridge trans., London, G. Bell 1891) (involving a Greek enchantress who killed
her children).
203. See Naomi Chase, Acknowledging the Susan Smith in Us All, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Aug. 8, 1995, at 5E, available in 1996 WL 7124234; Mike Doming, Su-
san Smith's Jurors Felt Her Pain: Quiet End Sought to Public Ordeal, CmI. TaM.,
July 30, 1995, at 3.
204. In fact, for many years, executions were public events, permitting the entire com-
munity to participate, at least vicariously. Eventually, however, public hangings lost
support because crowds became more rowdy and officials no longer believed that the
spectacle was having its desired deterrent effect. For a thorough recounting of the de-
cline and eventual abolition of public executions see generally COOPER, supra note 115.
205. "The true 'scapegoats' are those whom men have never recognized as such, in
whose guilt they have an unshaken belief." THINGS HIDDEN, supra note 142, at 46-47.
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turn trigger its own countermeasures. To a certain extent, the
United States already may have reached that state of affairs.
Although polls show that large majorities favor the death penal-
ty,..6 these majorities do not reach the point of consensus. Per-
haps most disturbingly, to the extent that the death penalty is
seen as disproportionately applied to members of identifiable
minority groups,' °7 the tendency of the penalty to divide, rath-
er than unite, the community becomes more acute.
If the ritual does not work, that is, does not unite the commu-
nity, the reaction will not be to abandon it, but to insist on its
repetition." 8 The attempts to do it just right, and therefore ef-
fectively, will become more frantic. Here one reaches a critical
point in the analysis. If Girard's theories do, in fact, explain the
essential nature and function of the death penalty, how should
the abolition debate be framed? Can the abolitionist argument
succeed without removing something critical to social stability?
B. How Does the Theory Alter the Death Penalty Debate?
As has been previously discussed the death penalty debate
has taken shape around the central notions of deterrence and
retribution.0 9 Although some commentators have noted the rit-
ual aspects of capital punishment, these observations are usual-
ly somewhat peripheral to the analysis.21 If Girard's theories
are valid, the traditional framework for debating the death pen-
alty must be altered. If the central function of the death penalty
is neither to deter potential bad actors by raising the cost of fu-
ture killings, nor to punish on the basis of desert, but to ritually
unite the community through an act of common violence against
a designated adversary, the usual arguments for and against
capital punishment may lose much of their relevance.
Girard himself will be of little help here. He does not use his
206. See TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 119-20.
207. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 170 and accompanying text; see also Laurence A. Grayer, Com-
ment, A Paradox: Death Penalty Flourishes in U.S. While Declining Worldwide, 23
DENY. J. INTL L. & POL', 555 (1995) (noting that only in the United States is the
use of the death penalty increasing).
209. See supra Part II.
210. See supra note 140.
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theories to make specific recommendations for social change.
Indeed, he has cautioned against the use of his ideas as weapons
to critique specific social practices. 1' Instead, he has advocated
a thorough societal rejection of mimetic violence, which he sees
as the inevitable result of the growth of the indictment of vio-
lence contained in the Christian gospels.212 Unlike Girard, le-
gal commentators are required to deal with particular questions
of social policy, and are constrained from basing arguments
entirely upon religious faith.21 Still, if the death penalty is es-
sentially an exercise in ritualized sacrifice meant to unify the
community, a number of specific consequences do seem to follow.
Abolitionists will likely find Girard's theories more attractive
than retentionists, but even retentionists may find that they can
draw support from the new analytical approach.
1. Implications for Retentionists
If Girard's theories are valid, the -symbolic function of the
death penalty is not merely an interesting side issue, but central
to its existence. Girard maintains that the ritualized community
violence employed by society is not merely a luxury, but serves
an important purpose.214 It creates a mechanism through
which the escalating urge to imitate violence can be broken.1 5
If that mechanism is taken away, what will ensue? Girard
sounds a warning: Effective rituals of violence, he says, appear
to be essential to social cohesion. In their absence, imitative
violence escalates unchecked.1 6
For retentionists, this could lead to a new line of argument.
The argument would resemble classical deterrence arguments in
211. "What is interesting in our work here is not the possibility of making impres-
sionistic applications of the theory in order to denounce any aspect of society we
please." THINGS HIDDEN, supra note 142, at 34.
212. See id. at 180-223.
213. For a discussion of the extent to which public policy arguments may accept-
ably rest on religious grounds in a liberal democracy, see KENT GREENWALT, RELI-
GIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
214. See GIRARD, supra note 14, at 17 (stating that sacrifice by society is "an in-
strument of prevention in the struggle against violence").
215. See id.
216. See id. at 119-20 (suggesting that festivals "commemorate a sacrificial crisis"
in order to bring the community together).
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that it would be consequentialist, but it would not assume that
those inclined to murder make rational cost-benefit calculations.
If the sacrificial ritual is effective, it will reduce the level of vio-
lence in the community, but not by altering people's perceptions
of the cost of committing violence. 217 Rather, it will reduce the
level of violence by breaking the cycle of imitative violence, and
by creating a sense of unity in the community in its opposition
to the executed criminal.218 If this is so, the effect may be re-
flected in indices far beyond the community's murder rate. Inter-
estingly enough, one recent study purports to show that the
community's use of the death penalty, although it does not serve
to reduce the homicide rate, is correlated with a reduction in
lesser crimes.1 9 In terms of classic deterrence theory, this
would seem to be a mere coincidence. How can increasing the
penalty for act A deter people from committing act B? If deter-
rence is not a matter of rational cost-benefit analysis, however,
but rather a consequence of reduction in the need for members
of the community to act in hostile, aggressive ways generally, it
may be more than coincidence.
In short, retentionists could argue that Girard has demon-
strated that societal cohesion requires at least occasional formal
use of the ultimate penalty in order to unify the community. If
this argument is accepted as true, then it easily follows that the
proper victim of such a sacrifice should be one who has set him-
self deliberately against community norms in the most radical
way possible, by deliberately taking the life of another. To aban-
don the death penalty, then, would be to deprive the community
of an important tool of social cohesion. Gregg v. Georgia2. rec-
ognized that in a modern society committed to the rule of law,
the victim must not be chosen in an arbitrary way, but rather in
217. See id. at 124 (proposing that ritual violence will not awaken hostility in the group).
218. See id. (stating that [t]he community stands united before the onslaught of
'evil spirits'.").
219. See William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Capital Punishment and Non.Capi-
tal Crimes: A Test of Deterrence, General Prevention, and System-Overload Argu-
ments, 54 ALB. L. REV. 681, 699 (1990) (stating that, on the basis of their research,
they have determined that capital punishment has an effect on crimes such as rob-'
bery, burglary, and assault when executions receive a certain amount of television
coverage).
220. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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a way that is accepted by the community as rational."2 This
reform was necessary in order to maintain the social acceptance
of capital punishment, without which it could not serve its unify-
ing function. To go further, according to this retentionist argu-
ment, would be dangerous because the abandonment of the
death penalty could foster disunity.
Basically, a retentionist might accept Girard's work insofar as
it is descriptive, but reject his call for a renunciation of all forms
of sacrificial community violence as dangerous and utopian.
Even the descriptive parts of Girard's theory will present prob-
lems for retentionists, however, as will be seen in the following
section.
2. Implications for Abolitionists
Abolitionist arguments have tended to take one of two differ-
ent forms. The first, exemplified by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, rejects capital punishment in theory as well as in prac-
tice.22 The second, exemplified by the final death penalty opin-
ions of Justice Blackmun,2" is more modest. Instead of at-
tacking the fundamental theoretical underpinnings of capital
punishment, it focuses on the empirical reality of the prac-
tice. 4 The capriciousness and unfairness of that empirical
reality, and its failure to satisfy the demands of the theory es-
tablish that even if the theory is sound, the practice is indefensi-
221. See id. at 188-95 (explaining that a jury will not be allowed to sentence a
defendant in a "capricious or arbitrary" manner).
222. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating
that the imposition of death is a socially unacceptable denial of human dignity that
violates the Eighth Amendment); id. at 342-70 (Marshall, J., concurring) (concluding
that the death penalty does not foster the goals of retribution, deterrence, preventing
recidivism, encouraging confessions, eugenics, or reducing state expenditures, and
that the public is morally opposed to capital punishment).
223. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It is
virtually self-evident to me now that no combination of procedural rules or substan-
tive regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional defi-
ciencies."); see also Sims v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2782 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing to denial of cert.).
224. "The problem is that the inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error gives
us a system that we know must wrongly kill some defendants, a system that fails
to deliver the fair, consistent, and reliable sentences of death required by the Con-
stitution." Callins, 510 U.S. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ble.' In the 1970s, centrist Justices struck down the preva-
lent death penalty statutes, but continued to maintain that
defensible procedures were possible." 6 Justice Blackmun, in
essence, took this a step further, concluding that, as a practical
matter, creating a death penalty that satisfies the demands of
its own underlying theory is impossible."7
On the surface, the Brennan-Marshall approach seems more
attractive to abolitionists. It is more "principled;" it refutes
death penalty advocates more thoroughly. By disposing of the
underlying theory, it assures the end of capital punishment, not
merely its reform. The Blackmun approach is seen as conceding
too much, as insufficiently grounded in principle; it is somewhat
grudgingly endorsed as a second-best approach. Perhaps, howev-
er, the emphasis placed on these two lines of argument should
be reversed.
Gil Bailie calls attention to Girard's conclusion that the ritual-
ized killing that unifies the community loses its effectiveness if
and when the community begins to question assumptions such
as the actual guilt of the victim.2" Girard states that the com-
munity turns away from violence, then, not because it rejects
the theory that one who has caused intolerable dissension by his
own acts of violence deserves to die, but rather because it sees
that its chosen victim is not really guilty of that at all.229 For
Girard, writing from a radical Christian perspective, the para-
225. See id. at 1155-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
226. See id. at 1147-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining the series of decisions
by the Supreme Court regarding capital punishment).
227. See id. at 1157 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (holding that capital punishment is
unconstitutional).
From the moment when knowledge of the mechanism begins to spread,
there can be no turning back. It is impossible to rehabilitate a sacrificial
mechanism in the process of decomposition because growing awareness of
these mechanisms is what decomposes them; any effort to interrupt or
reverse the process can only be made at the cost of the knowledge being
disseminated.
THINGS HIDDEN, supra note 142, at 128.
228. Once we see a victim as a victim, we empathize, and "unanimity requires that
all empathy for the victim or victims of the violence be extinguished." BAILIE, supra
note 142, at 16. Bailie comments on contemporary society's increasing tendency to
identify itself with victims, rather than with victors. See id. at 17-29.
229. See THINGS HIDDEN, supra note 142, at 180-223.
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digm here is the execution of Jesus." ° The community's execu-
tion of one who is totally innocent leads those who can see the
magnitude of the injustice to reject the very notion of returning
violence for violenceY Prior beliefs about the justice of retri-
bution must give way to the harsh reality of its misuse.
As this Article has shown, the proposition that capital punish-
ment advances the goal of deterrence significantly has been ex-
tensively refuted. 2 Abolitionists, however, have had less suc-
cess in refuting the theory of retribution. Perhaps it is best to
turn away from attempts to establish that an undoubtedly
guilty, fully competent and volitional, deliberate murderer does
not merit the death penalty and toward more persistent at-
tempts to illustrate the gap between this theoretical proposition
and the actual practice of capital punishment.
When Michigan, in 1847, became the first jurisdiction to aban-
don capital punishment, it did so largely in response to public
revulsion over the execution of a prisoner subsequently shown to
be innocent. 3 The most compelling arguments made against
the death penalty in modern times often focus on its use in cases
that, if not involving the innocent,' at least involve killers
who seem less than fully competent or volitional.' Even when
the death penalty is rejected in principle, the basis is likely to be
grounded in religious conviction, rather than an attempt to ra-
tionally refute retributive theory. 6
230. See id. at 202-20; BAILIE, supra note 142, at 217-33.
231. See THINGS HIDDEN, supra note 142, at 202-20.
232. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 57, at 167-86 (concluding that any deter-
rent effect is slight at best).
233. See Rachel Reynolds, Byline, Gannett News Service, Sept. 18, 1989, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Arcaws file (explaining that the death penalty was struck
down after an innocent man was hung for the rape and murder of a young woman).
234. For an inventory of erroneously decided death penalty cases, see MICHAEL L.
RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE 282-356 (1992).
235. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); see generally EMILY F. REED,
THE PENRY PENALTY: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDA-
TION (1993) (criticizing the Supreme Court's decision allowing mentally retarded
individuals who have committed capital crimes to be sentenced to death).
236. For example, see HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEWITNESS AC-
COUNT OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1993), providing a powerful
critique of capital punishment that does not seek to deny the guilt of offenders, but,
rather, is based explicitly upon the religious conviction that retaliation is wrong.
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Thus, it is unlikely that a direct assault on the theories put
forward to support the death penalty will effectively refute it.
Instead, a strategy that points out the empirical reality of the
death penalty, and the ways in which it fails to satisfy the de-
mands of the theories used to justify it, may effectively erode the
ability of executions to perform their function of unifying the
community. Girard, again writing from his radical Christian per-
spective, sees the ultimate victory of those who reject retributive
violence as flowing from the inevitable, if gradual and fitful,
spread of the lessons learned in the aftermath of the execution
of Christ. 7 The failure of the death penalty to satisfy rational
demands placed on it by retributive theory, however, also can be
argued in secular terms."s
Deterrence theory can be debated on the basis of empirical
evidence. 9 Even so, once the burden of proof is placed upon
opponents of capital punishment, and set at a level that de-
mands a great deal of certainty, the deterrence debate becomes
futile. It will never be possible to disprove deterrence with suffi-
cient certainty to satisfy that burden.4 Further, as this Arti-
cle has shown, deterrence theory seems less and less central to
the debate, even as it is understood currently. Most abolitionists
and retentionists seem committed to their positions regardless of
the evidence on deterrence. Deterrence seems to be an argument
added to bolster a position already taken.
On its face, retribution theory does not depend on empirical
evidence. Instead, retribution depends on the validity of the
proposition that, as applied to capital punishment, one who de-
liberately kills deserves to die. It may be futile to argue with
that central contention, as a matter of abstract theory. But the
process of deciding who has killed, and more importantly, who
has killed with sufficient deliberation, is subject to empirical
analysis. To demonstrate that the current system of applying
capital punishment, or perhaps any practical system for doing
237. See THINGS HIDDEN, supra note 142, at 180-223.
238. This approach is essentially the one taken by Justice Blackmun in his final
death penalty opinions. See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
239. For a discussion of empirical data and research methods used in developing
such data, see ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 8, at 92-268.
240. See Ud. at 327-36 (explaining the problems of measurement in deterrence studies).
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so, will fall far short of its stated goal of identifying the most
culpable killers may effectively undermine faith in the sanction.
Such a demonstration will not undermine the theoretical validi-
ty of retributive notions, but instead will undermine the practi-
cal ability to act as the theory demands. Justice Blackmun's own
change of heart is the most prominent example of such a loss of
faith.2" Furthermore, Girard's theories would predict that
when enough members of the community reach that conclusion,
the death penalty will be unable to achieve its primary purpose
of forging community unity.242
To conclude that the most effective way to attack the death
penalty is to undermine confidence in its ability to satisfy in
practice the demands of retributive theory, however, leaves cru-
cial questions unanswered. Girard's theories present abolition-
ists with a significant challenge. If one accepts the notion that
ritualized community violence plays an important role in bring-
ing about and maintaining social cohesion,"'3 then the elimina-
tion of the ritual, or the process of undermining its ability to
unite the community, is not self-evidently a good thing. Girard
warns that a society deprived of its ritual violence may fall
apart, because it will lack any method of putting an end to the
intensifying cycle of imitative violence to which all societies are
drawn.2" Therefore, abolitionists must face the question of
whether it is reasonable to risk these negative social conse-
quences by undermining the death penalty as a means of achiev-
ing social harmony.
Perhaps this question is somewhat academic. To a large ex-
tent, the damage to the social function of the death penalty al-
ready may have been done. Although majorities currently favor
capital punishment, the minority that opposes it is by no means
241. See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
242. See GIRARD, supra note 14, at 119-42.
243. "[Dlemystification of the system necessarily coincides with the disintegration of
that system. .. . In fact, demystification leads to constantly increasing violence." Id.
at 24. Unless the renunciation of present forms of violence itself repudiates violence,
it may well be a step backward. See THINGS HIDDEN, supra note 142, at 245.
244. The violence that replaces ritual violence may be "more energetic, more viru-
lent, and the harbinger of something far worse-a violence that knows no bounds."
GIRARD, supra note 14, at 24-25.
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insignificant. 5 The disproportionate use of the death penalty
in cases involving racial minorities is accentuating division in
the overall community, rather than promoting unity.246 Out-
spoken opposition to executions, either in general or in particu-
lar, destroys the solemn unanimity of the community in its vio-
lence toward the condemned individual, and in so doing, inter-
feres with the ritual's effectiveness. To Girard, this opposition
results from the inevitable spread of the Christian message.247
Whether it is a consequence of religious or secular conviction,
and whether it is a trend that inevitably will grow or not, it
seems clear that capital punishment does not have the power to
break the cycle of social violence effectively.
When the ritual does not work, one response is to demand
that it be repeated more often, until it does work. Thus, it is
unsurprising that the first few executions of the modern era led
to demands for more, and that the current fifty or so executions
that occur each year have, in turn, merely led to demands for
more, and swifter, instances of capital punishment.24 Never-
theless, if the first few executions failed to unite the community,
those that follow are also likely to fail. The question remains
whether the response of the community will be to turn away
from violence or to demand even more.
If one believes, as Girard does, in the ultimate and inevitable
triumph of the message of nonviolence,249 then perhaps one can
go about the task of delegitimizing violent social institutions
245. One clear example of this minority viewpoint is expressed by Girard. See infra
note 249 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
247. See GIRARD, supra note 14, at 119-42.
248. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (discussing the growing demand
for expediting the death penalty process).
249.
[Elverything in the Kingdom of God comes down to the project of ridding
men of violence....
To leave violence behind, it is necessary to give up the idea of retribu-
tion; it is therefore necessary to give up forms of conduct that have al-
ways seemed to be natural and legitimate... . what must be given up is
the right to reprisals and even the right to what passes, in a number of
cases, for legitimate defence.
THINGS HIDDEN, supra note 142, at 197-98.
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with no particular recommendation for how to replace them."so
This is especially so if the suggested replacement merely miti-
gates, rather than eliminates, the use of violence as a tool of
social control. If one concedes, however, that the millennium is
not imminent,"' one must address in the near term the very
real problem for abolitionists posed by Girard's theories. If the
ritual violence of capital punishment cannot unite the communi-
ty, then what substitute can achieve that end?
At the very least, opposition to the death penalty should not
be presented merely as part of a broad denial of the legitimacy
of social values widely held by the community, specifically the
strong disapproval of violent crime. Not only would such an ar-
gument be unlikely to succeed, but if it were to succeed, it would
in all likelihood leave a significant part of the community with
enough unrelieved anger to make social unrest and backlash
highly probable. Thus, through both rhetoric and practical pro-
posals, such as advocacy of life sentences without parole, a re-
sponsible abolitionist argument must give the community a way,
short of actual execution, to unify in its condemnation of violent
crimes. Nevertheless, although the need may be clear for suc-
cessful alternatives to the ritual functions currently achieved
through the death penalty, the specific question of the nature of
such alternatives needs much more thought.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that most western de-
mocracies, for all practical purposes, have abolished the death
penalty. 2 Yet, several of these countries retain it in theory for
250. Thus, Girard stated: "I am fully in favour of the major liquidation of philoso-
phy and the sciences of man that is currently taking plae .... the real accomplish-
ments of modem thought .. . are critical and negative." Id. at 135-36. Further, this
"desacrilization" process must be followed by '[tihe definitive renunciation of violence,
without any second thoughts . . . the condition sine qua non for the survival of hu-
manity itself.. . ." Id. at 137.
251. The millennium, in Christian theology, is the thousand-year period of peace
foreseen in the Book of Revelations. See JOHN F. HARRISON, THE SECOND COMING:
POPULAR MILENARIANISM 1780-1850, at 3-10 (1979). Premillennialists believe that
this period will follow the Second Coming of Christ. See id. at 4. Postmillennialists,
in contrast, believe that the climax of the thousand-year period of righteousness will
be the Second Coming of Christ. See id. Contrary to widespread belief, the
millenium does not have any necessary connection with the expiration of any partic-
ular thousand-year period calculated from the birth of Christ. See id. at 5, 7.
252. See ZIMBING & HAWKINS, supra note 57, at 4-6.
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some exceptionally rare instances, such as certain acts commit-
ted in time of -war.' Perhaps the mere presence of the ulti-
mate sanction on the statute books, even if it is never, or hardly
ever invoked, helps to satisfy the need for social solidarity. It
does, after all, proclaim the community's belief that someone,
even if that person is only hypothetical, justifiably is the target
of the whole community's wrath. Thus, the fact that the death
penalty is available in Israel for those guilty of Nazi atrocities
may well serve a salutary social purpose, even though only one
man has ever been executed under this provision.'
Perhaps, then, the practical abolition of the death penalty will
require a concession that it is still available in theory. This re-
turns the discussion, in a way, to what for many is the begin-
ning of the death penalty debate: the Bible. As previously noted,
the Bible solemnly prescribes death as appropriate punishment,
but, in practice, ancient Israel constructed procedures to assure
infrequent application. 5 Thus, the community satisfied its
need to afirm its solidarity in opposing the crime without re-
quiring actual, frequent executions. If one embraces this theory,
current trends in the United States are disturbing. Increasingly,
calls are being made, not only for the enactment of death pen-
alty statutes, but for streamlined procedures that will assure the
completion of more executions. 6
Unfortunately, then, the question of whether effective alterna-
tive rituals can serve the same social function of uniting the
community in opposition to a common enemy must remain open.
Girard's theories suggest that the question of alternative rituals
must be addressed if real progress is to be made in furthering
the abolitionist cause.
V. CONCLUSION
In a legal environment that assumes rational argument to be
the foundation of governmental decision making, it is easy to
overlook the possibility that elements of the legal system are
253. See id. at 5.
254. See id. at 6. The exception, of course, was Nazi war criminal AdolfEichmann. See id.
255. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
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best explained by powerful, nonrational motives. The contempo-
rary debate over capital punishment proceeds, as it has for cen-
turies, with a focus on rational justifications for the practice.
Yet, powerful evidence that the practice does not advance the
rational goals set forth as its objectives should make one wonder
about society's basic assumptions concerning the death penalty's
real function.
Although commentators have noted the symbolic function of
executions, this usually has been relegated to the margins of the
debate; unsurprisingly, the debate has focused on the purported
goals of deterrence and retribution. Upon close examination,
however, these goals seem strangely beside the point. Support-
ers of the death penalty are unmoved by evidence that it does
not deter violent crime, or by evidence that in practice the death
penalty falls woefully short of the demands of retributive theory.
Perhaps, then, the key to understanding the death penalty is
to see it as filling a nonrational, yet very real, need. Ren6
Girard's theory of mimetic violence provides an intriguing alter-
native explanation for the death penalty, and one that also ex-
plains its resistance to rational argument. If Girard is correct,
the death penalty serves primarily as a ritual of violence
through which the community attempts to unify itself, concen-
trating its urge to mimetic violence on one individual identified
as the other, the enemy of the community. If the death penalty
should be understood in this way then one must view the sur-
rounding debate in a fundamentally different way.
The debate over the deterrent effect of capital punishment
seems to be largely irrelevant. Not only has the Supreme Court
decided that a showing of deterrence is unnecessary, 1 7 but
most death penalty supporters, even if they believe in the deter-
rent effect of the death penalty, do not seem to rest their sup-
port of capital punishment on the existence of such an effect. As
retribution becomes more central to the justification of capital
punishment, it is unsurprising that abolitionists find themselves
feeling the need to challenge the fundamental notion that a de-
liberate, fully volitional killer deserves to die under any circum-
stances.
257. See Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798-99 (1982).
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If Girard's theories explain capital punishment, then the truth
or falsity of the retribution proposition is not really at the heart
of the practice. The death penalty is, at its core,
consequentialist, but not in the sense that it will deter potential
killers by getting them to adjust their mental cost-benefit calcu-
lations. Instead, it seeks to reduce the amount of violence in the
community by creating communal unity in opposition to the exe-
cuted killer. The ability of the death penalty to achieve those
consequentialist goals is largely dependent upon the extent to
which the community believes that it is applied consistently
with deeply held retributivist ideas.
Rather than launching a frontal assault on the theoretical
legitimacy of the death penalty, particularly under retributive
theory, perhaps the most effective way to attack the death pen-
alty is to expose its failings, in the real world, to satisfy the de-
mands of retributive theory. Does the present system actually
determine, in a reliable way, the subset of killers who are most
culpable? Can any system do so?" 8 If these questions continue
to be raised effectively, they may seriously interfere with the
ability of the death penalty to serve its central purpose of unit-
ing the community. Of course, this route holds its own dangers.
One response to the failure of the death penalty to "work" might
be not to abandon it, but rather to expand it, in an attempt to
somehow get it to work. After all, its proponents are unclear
about just why it once worked, and so they will fail to under-
stand the futility of trying to make a divisive death penalty do
the work of unifying the community. Furthermore, the need for
the unifying ritual to break the cycle of mimetic violence will
remain.
Retentionists, of course, can draw their own conclusions from
Girard's theories. They may argue that his theories merely dem-
onstrate the important function that capital punishment serves,
258. Jewish law, which set up such high procedural barriers to executions as to
make them nearly impossible, did so in light of the fallibility of any human judg-
ment, however careful. "In effect, the law demands a differentiation between the
quality of God's omniscient justice and the fragile, fallible justice of the worldly
courts." Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 122, at 620. Thus, the inevitability of
imperfection in judging guilt weighed heavily against imposing punishment, even
when guilt seemed probable. See id.
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one that is abandoned only at the risk of removing an important
tool to further peace in the community. Rituals are not merely
amusing sideshows; they are crucial to any community.
Opponents of the death penalty must accept the challenge of
providing alternative ways of allowing the community to effec-
tively express its unity in opposing violent crime. Finding such
alternatives will not be easy. In a diverse, contentious, frag-
mented nation, forging unifying rituals that are effective will be
a challenge. The first step is to realize that such a task is neces-
sary. That realization will require serious consideration of the
possibility that the rationalist arguments over deterrence and
retribution, which both sides assume are at the core of the death
penalty debate, may be far less important than they seem.
